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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-Procedural Due Process-Civil Service Commission
Must Grant Open and Public Hearing Where Illegal Discharge from Statutorily Protected Employment Is Nonfrivolously Alleged.-Plaintiff was
separated from his Defense Department position after having given testimony
before a congressional committee on cost overruns in the Air Force C5A program. The Civil Service Rules and Regulations regarding removal from federal employment did not apply to plaintiff's position,1 but as a "preference
eligible" 2 he was entitled to certain benefits under the terms of the Veterans
Preference Act.3 Among those benefits was a hearing before the Civil Service
Commission to appeal any "adverse action" 4 which might be taken against him.
The Defense Department gave as a reason for its action the abolition of
plaintiff's position due to a reduction-in-force. Plaintiff felt that his dismissal
had been retaliatory--certainly an "adverse action." He requested a hearing
before the Commission, which was granted; 6 however, the Commission refused
his repeated requests that the hearing be "open to the public and press." 7
Plaintiff then brought suit on this issue in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. The court granted his motion for summary judgment and enjoined
the Commission from conducting further dosed hearings.8 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,
holding that: (a) having non-frivolously alleged wrongful discharge from his
1.

Plaintiff's position was in the "excepted service;" that is, it was a position included

within the terms of that section of the Code of Federal Regulations which provides:
"Except as may be required by statute, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations shall not
apply to removals from positions . . . excepted from the competitive service by statute."
5 C.F.R. § 6.4 (1971). However, the proviso "[e]xcept as may be required by statute"
controlled. See notes 2-4 infra.
2. The term "preference eligible" is used to define a category which includes various
classes of veterans and their dependents. 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (1970).
3. Id. §§ 1302, 2108, 3305, 3306, 3308-20, 3351, 3363-64, 3501-04, 7512, 7701.
4. An "adverse action" is defined as "a removal, suspension for more than 30 days, furlough without pay, or reduction in rank or pay." Id. § 7511(2). Such action may only be
taken by an agency for such cause as will "promote the efficiency of the service," and,
generally, only after 30 days written notice, an opportunity to answer the charges and notice
to the employee of a decision against him. Id. § 7512. A preference eligible employee has
the right to appeal an unfavorable decision to the Civil Service Commission. Id. § 7701.
5. A reduction-in-force separation is not, by definition, an "adverse action," and no
provision is made for a hearing in the case of such a step. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d
755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

6. The Defense Department maintained that the granting of a hearing to Fitzgerald by
the Civil Service Commission was not inconsistent with its position that only a reductionin-force separation had occurred. The Department argued that it was the Commission's
"practice" to grant hearings in such circumstances, even though a hearing could not be
demanded as of right. 467 F.2d at 758.
7. Id. at 757.
8. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 329 F. Supp. 997 (D.D.C. 1971).
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statutorily protected employment, plaintiff was entitled to a hearing as of right
and; (b) the due process clause of the fifth amendment required that that
hearing be open and public. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to review executive action. As
early as 1840, in Decatur v. Paulding,9 the Supreme Court expressed the rule
that while "ministerial" actions might be reviewed, actions involving the exercise of discretion on the part of an executive officer or agency were not proper
objects of judicial scrutiny. As the Court stated it:
The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief;
and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was never intended to be given to
them.10
The Decatur case held that the federal courts lacked authority, on a petition
for mandamus, to review a determination by the Secretary of the Navy that
the widow of a naval officer was not entitled to a special pension." In subsequent years, actions held to be discretionary, and hence not reviewable, included: the granting of federal land patents;'- the valuation of goods by a
customs official; 13 and decisions of immigration authorities on whether to exclude aliens from admission to the United States under the immigration laws.1 4
During the period of its tenure, the ministerial-discretionary formula for
testing reviewability proved an insurmountable obstacle to many litigants who
wished to contest dismissal from federal employment. As the Supreme Court
noted in Keim v. United States,15
[t]he appointment to an official position in the Government, even if it be simply a
clerical position, is not a mere ministerial act, but one involving the exercise of judgment. ... In the absence of specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal
from office is incident to the power of appointment.' 0
9. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 418 (1840). For an example of an administrative action which was
thought at .the time of the Decatur case to be "ministerial" see Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 364 (1838) (entry of credit in account by Postmaster General
pursuant to order of Congress).
10. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 434.
11. Id. at 418. See also United States ex re. Redfield v. Wmdom, 137 U.S. 636 (1891);
United States ex rel Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888).
12. United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903); Gaines v.
Thompson, 74 US. (7 WaIL) 347 (1868).
13. Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U.S. 25 (1885).
14. tem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 US. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
15. 177 US. 290 (1900). Keim was a clerk in the Department of the Interior who had
brought an action in the Court of Claims to protest his dismissal for inefficiency. The Supreme Court affirmed that court's holding that it did not have authority to supervise the
Interior Department with respect to its personnel policy. "These are matters," said the
Court, "peculiarly within the province of those who are in charge of and superintending
the departments." Id. at 296.
16. Id. at 293.
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Not long after Keim, however, it became apparent that the Court's rigid
stance on review of the executive had begun to waiver. In the 1902 case of
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,1 7 the Court was requested to pass on the propriety of an order of the Postmaster General which
barred plaintiff school from receiving mail on the ground that its medical
claims were fraudulent. The Court decided that it could review and invalidate
the order, establishing the principle that executive actions involving the determination of law questions may be reviewed by the judiciary. 18 Decatur, in
which a contrary conclusion had been drawn, was not mentioned.
Magnetic Healing was the first step toward the development of what has
been termed the "presumption of reviewability."19 This presumption has been
defined to mean that "administrative action is reviewable unless (a) legislative
intent to the contrary can be found or (b) some special reason calling for
unreviewability.12 0 Cases which followed Magnetic Healing held that such
administrative actions as alien exclusion 21 and denial of land patents22 were in
fact proper subjects for review. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States23 the Court went so far as to affirm the reviewability of administrative
factual determinations.2 4 Significantly, the advent of the "presumption of reviewability" approach paved the way for judicial review of dismissals from
17. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
18. Id. at 108.
19. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 339 passim (1965).
20. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 28.02, at 510 (3d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Davis, Text]. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) ;
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944);
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167 (1936). What would constitute a "special
reason" for denying reviewability is an interesting question. Professor Davis gives two
examples: the removal of enemy aliens during wartime, Ledecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160
(1948); and the denial of an army commission, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
Davis, Text § 28.02, at 510 n.10.
21. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
22. Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917).
23. 298 U.S. 38 (1936). The Secretary of Agriculture had been empowered by Congress
to set maximum rates in the stockyards industry, provided those rates were "reasonable."
Pursuant to this authorization the Secretary held hearings, received testimony, and then
issued an order setting the rates. Plaintiff company brought an action alleging that the rates
set were not supported by the evidence which had been adduced at the hearings, and hence
were not "reasonable." The Court held that the evidence did in fact support the Secretary's
determination but noted as well that it was in the power of the federal courts to review
such administrative findings. Id. at 71-72.
24. Id. at 52. According to the Court, "to say that [the agency's] findings of fact may
be made conclusive where constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved, although
the evidence clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have
been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously
to impair the security inherent in our judicial safeguards." Id.
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public employment; such review has since been uniformly granted on both
state and federal 26 levels.
Concurrent with this expansion of the scope of reviewability of administrative
actions came the determination that administrative actions resulting in the
deprivation of liberty or property must meet the due process requirements of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.-r In the Japanese Immigrant Case -s the
Supreme Court declared in 1903:
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in20"due process of law"
as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Moreover, the list of administrative actions to which the due process standard
applies was greatly expanded by movement away from the "privilege doctrine"
under which only those actions which deprive of a right, as opposed to a
privilege had been held subject to constitutional strictures.3°
The "privilege doctrine" had particular applicability to the field of public
employment. In 1950 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held in Bailey v. Richardson31 that the due process clause of the fifth amendment did not apply to the dismissals of federal employees. Said the court:
It has been held repeatedly and consistently that Government employ is not "property" and that in this particular it is not a contract. We are unable to perceive how
it could be held to be "liberty." Certainly it is not "life." So much that is clear would
25. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 403 US.
564 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
26. See Cole v. Young, 351 US. 536 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 US. 331 (1955);
Garrott v. United States, 340 F.2d 615 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1952); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), arid per curiam,
341 U.S. 918 (1951); Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
27. Although it has never explicitly been held that the "due process" requirements of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments coincide in their demands on federal and state administrative proceedings, cases involving review of federal proceedings regularly rely on the authority
of prior decisions dealing with state proceedings. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 491 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J. concurring); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936). Conversely, cases dealing with due process in state proceedings cite cases arising in a federal context. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
28. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Petitioner in this case, a Japanese alien incarcerated pending
deportation, was found nevertheless to have been given a sufficient hearing and to have been
afforded due process of law. Id. at 101.
29. Id. at 100.
30. For a discussion of the "privilege" doctrine see 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise, § 7.11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Treatise]; Davis, Text § 7.12.
31. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 US. 918 (1951); see notes 60 &
61 infra and accompanying text.
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the due process clause does not apply to the
seem to dispose of the point. In
32 terms
holding of a Government office.
This decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court.83 Furthermore, on at least one other occasion the Court, in dictum, suggested the conclusion that public employment is a "privilege" and not a "right." 8 4 The force
of these opinions, however, has been dissipated by later cases. In the 1972
case of Board of Regents v. Roth,85 Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court,
referred to Bailey in the following terms:
The basis of its holding has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years. For,
as Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court only last year, 'this Court now has
rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege." '80
The Roth decision, and that of the Court in Perry v. Sindermann,87 handed
down on the same day, made significantly clearer the conditions under which
discharge of public employees must conform to due process requirements. In
Roth, plaintiff was an associate professor at a Wisconsin state university whose
contract had not been renewed. Roth did not have tenure and the one year
contract under which he was employed specifically provided that the granting
of a new contract for the ensuing year would be discretionary on the part of
the university. When the university failed to renew the contract, Roth brought
suit, claiming that he had been discharged without due process.88 In Sindermann
plaintiff was a junior college professor who, in contrast to Roth, had been at
his post for ten years, and was, moreover, a department co-chairman and
president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association. Although the
junior college which employed Sindermann did not give official tenure, there
was an "unofficial" tenure system, and Sindermann was entitled to "unofficial" tenure. When his contract was not renewed, Sindermann alleged that this
failure to renew was in retaliation for his public opposition to the State Board
of Regents on a policy issue, and for testimony given by him before a state
legislative committee.8 9 The Supreme Court found merit in Sindermann's due
32. Id. at 57.
33. 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam).
34. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959).
35. 408 U.S. 564 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 684 (1973).
36. Id. at 571 n.9.
37. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
38. 408 U.S. at 567-69. Specifically, Roth alleged that due process had been denied him
because he had not been given a hearing on the question of the renewal of his contract. Id.
39. 408 U.S. at 595. Sindermann also claimed that the action violated his right to
freedom of speech under the first amendment. Id. In this aspect the parallel to the Fitzgerald
case is striking. The Supreme Court held with respect to Sindermann's first amendment
allegation that he had indeed stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Said the
Court: "For at least a quarter-century, this court has made clear that even though a person
has no 'right' to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
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process claim 4 0 but not in Roth's. 41
According to the Court in Roth, the fourteenth amendment provides procedural safeguards of "security interests that a person has already acquired in
specific benefits."42 These property interests, the Court said,
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from independent sources [independent of the Constitution] such as state law
rules or understandings 43that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
The unofficial tenure which Sindermann had earned sprang from such an "understanding;" therefore it was entitled to the protection of due process of law."
The same could not be said with respect to Roth's position.4"
The Court also recognized in Roth that "liberty" as well as "property" deprivations may arise in employment cases. 46 Thus a discharge on some ground
such as "dishonesty, or immorality" which "stigmatizes" an employee's "good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity" must, the Court felt, also meet procedural
due process standards. 47 Consistent with this approach was the Court's earlier
48
a 1956 case in which the
decision in Slochower v. Board of Higher Educations
summary discharge of a tenured university professor for claiming his fifth
amendment privilege before a legislative committee was held to be unlawful. 4 D
Once it has been established that a particular administrative action must meet
procedural due process standards, the question arises, naturally enough, as to
what these standards are. In th§ Japanese Immigrant Casew the Court announced
that one of the principles of due process "is that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without opportunity ... to be heard ... in respect of the matters
upon which that liberty depends .... ."5 The same has been held true when
the contemplated action stands to deprive a person of a property interest.ca
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech!' Id. at 597.
It will be recalled that Fitzgerald, like Sindermann, averred that his dismissal had been in
retaliation for testimony given before a legislative committee.
40. Id. at 598.
41. 408 U.S. at 579.
42. Id. at 576.
43. Id. at 577.
44. 408 U.S. at 601-02.

45. 408 US. at 578.
46. Id. at 572-73.
47. Id. at 573; see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
48. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).

49. Id. Said the Court: "[We must condemn the practice of imputing a sinister meaning
to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at S57.
50. See notes 28 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
51. 189 US. 86, 101 (1903) (emphasis added); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 US. 471
(1972).

52. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933)
(railroad required to replace crossing with overpass); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F2d 570
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (contractor barred from future government contracts).
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Even when it has been determined that a hearing is requisite, there remains
the question of what form that hearing must take. What specific procedural
rights does the due process clause guarantee? Must the hearing be a full blown
"trial" type hearing, or will it suffice merely to give the person proposed to be
acted against an opportunity to present his side of the argument?
Professor Davis suggests that the type of hearing to be given ought to depend
on the nature of the question involved. It is his position that where "adjudicative
facts" are at issue, i.e., facts "about the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties," 53 a "trial" type hearing, with the right to confrontation, crossexamination, and the introduction of rebuttal evidence and evidence in favor of
each party's position, is appropriate. 54 Where, on the other hand, questions of
law or policy, or "legislative facts," i.e., "general facts that are used for making
law or policy or for guiding the exercise of discretion," 5 are involved, a "trial"
type hearing is unnecessary. For such issues, Davis suggests, an "argument" or
"presentation of ideas" is sufficient. 6
While this approach has some support in the case law,57 there is authority as
well that questions of law require a "trial" type hearing. 8
Perhaps the most litigated procedural rights area has been that involving the
right of a party to confront and cross-examine witnesses who present evidence
adverse to his position. Many cases in this area arose out of the "loyalty" programs of the early nineteen-fifties. 59 In Bailey v. Richardson,00 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the government bad an
overriding interest in maintaining security and that, therefore, the denial of the
right of confrontation to an employee dismissed because of "reasonable grounds
for belief of disloyalty" had not been improper."' However, this holding has been
brought into question by the subsequent Supreme Court cases of Peters v.
53. Davis, Text § 7.04, at 160.
54. Davis, Treatise § 7.02, at 412. According to this authority: "The true principle Is that
a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination of governmental
action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of
rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative
facts, except in the rare circumstances when some other interest such as national security,
justifies an overriding of the interest in fair hearing." Id.
55. Davis, Text § 7.03, at 160.
56. Id. § 7.01, at 157; Davis, Treatise § 7.01.
57. See, e.g., Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961); Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358

U.S. 872 (1958).
58. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. granted and remanded,
337 U.S. 901 (1949); L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
59. E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th
Cir. 1955); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curlam, 341 U.S.
918 (1951) ; see Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). See also Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536

(1956).
60. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ; see text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
61. 182 F.2d at 61.
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Hobby6 2 and Greene v. McElroy. 3 Peters, a part-time government consultant,
was barred from further government employ on the basis of secret reports made
by F.B.I. agents." At his hearing before a loyalty board he was not informed of
the charges against him, nor was he given the opportunity to confront his
accusers. The Supreme Court declared the proceeding improper, but did not base
its decision on due process grounds. Instead, the Court found that the procedures
adopted had not been authorized by the executive order establishing the loyalty
boards. 65 In Greene a similar approach was taken. Greene had been denied a
security clearance on the strength of the testimony of witnesses whom he was
not allowed to confront. Although not a government employee, the withholding
of a clearance made it impossible for him to obtain work in his field of aeronautical engineering. 66 As in Peters the Court felt the procedures by vhich this
result had been accomplished exceeded statutory authorization.0r
Although the Greene case was not decided on constitutional grounds, the Court
implied strongly that it considered the condemned procedures unconstitutional."s
Indeed, Greene has been cited in later opinions to support the proposition that
due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine one's accusers
in many administrative proceedings. 69
Confrontation and cross-examination in the administrative context were given
further refinement a year after the Greene decision when, in 1960, the Court
decided the case of Hannah v. Larche.'
The Hannah case went far in creating a framework for the determination of
what procedural rights inhere in a particular administrative proceeding. The case
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

349 U.S. 331 (1955).
360 US. 474 (1959).
349 U.S. at 335-37.
Id. at 338.
360 U.S. at 475-76. It was on the basis of this disability that the Court distinguished

Greene from the plaintiff in the later case of Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961). There the employee whose clearance was revoked was a short order

cook employed by a concessionaire at the Naval Gun Factory. The Court felt that nothing
about her discharge would impair her ability to obtain similar employment esewhere, something which could not be said of Greene. Id. at 896, 898.
67. 360 U.S. at 508.
68. Id. at 504. Of the clearance program, the Court said that it "embodies procedures
traditionally believed to be inadequate to protect affected persons." Id.
69. See, e.g., Wfllner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), in which
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, cited Greene to support the following statement:

"We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood." Id. at
103. The probable reason why decisions in many of the state cases are based upon constitutional grounds while the decisions in cases dealing with federal administrative actions do not
is that the Supreme Court can construe the enabling legislation in cases dealing with federal
action as narrowly as it wishes, thereby avoiding constitutional questions, whereas the Court
has no power to construe state legislation, but must deal with the legislation as construed
by the state courts.
70. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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itself dealt with the right of voting registrars called as witnesses before the
Civil Rights Commission in regard to alleged discriminatory practices to confront and cross-examine persons who had filed complaints against them with
the Commission. 71 The Court concluded that the registrars were not entitled to
confront and cross-examine the complaining parties,7 2 drawing a distinction not
unlike the "legislative fact'"-"adjudicative fact" one advocated by Professor
78
Davis:
Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which
directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use
the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On
the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for
example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being74conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.

Since the findings of the Civil Rights Commission are not "binding determinations," but rather take the form of proposals for action,75 a lesser standard of
due process was held appropriate.7 6 The significance of the Hannah decision
transcends the question of the right to confrontation and cross-examination. The
"adjudicatory"-"investigative" distinction seems suitable to the determination
of whether other in the panoply of procedural rights, the right to an open and
public hearing not excepted, apply to a particular administrative action."7
An open and public hearing has never explicitly been held by the Supreme
Court to be a requirement of due process in an administrative proceeding.78 The
Court, however, did hold in In Re Oliver,70 that criminal proceedings must be
71. Id. at 423-26.
72. Id. at 451. It has been said that even where a right to confrontation and crossexamination does inhere, it may be waived if the party asserting the right makes no effort
to produce for cross-examination the witness with whose testimony he takes Issue or, where
the witness is an employee of the agency seeking the adverse ruling, if the party falls to
give the agency adequate notice of his desire to cross-examine. See Williams v. Zuckert, 372
U.S. 765 (1963) (per curiam); Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ; Begendorf v. United States, 340 F.2d 362 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (per curiam); McTiernan v. Gronouski,
337 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1964). However, if requests made of the agency by which the witness
is employed have gone unheeded, it is considered that personal attempts to produce the
witness would prove futile, and such attempts are therefore not required. Hanifan v. United
States, 354 F.2d 358 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (per curiam).
73. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
74. 363 U.S. at 442.
75. Id. at 443.
76. Id.
77. See text accompanying notes 97-99 infra.
78. See Davis, Treatise § 8.09 (Supp. 1970). A reason for this absence of authority is
apparent in the following statement: "The usual problem is not an agency's denial of a
public hearing, where a private party is protesting against secrecy; the usual problem is the
agency's insistence upon a public hearing, where a party is urging secrecy." Davis, Treatise
§ 8.09, at 550-51.
79. 333 U.S. 257 (1948). In the Oliver case, a Michigan judge, acting as a one man grandjury, heard testimony of the defendant, then cited him for contempt and Imposed a Jail
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open and public; and Professor Davis argues that the same consideration which
led the Court to require open criminal proceedings is present in most administrative proceedings: viz., the need for protection against arbitrary and capricious actionYs ° Strong preference for open and public proceedings has been
expressed by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
a body established in 1940 to analyze and make recommendations about the
procedures used by the many federal administrative bodies. 8 ' According to the
Committee's Report, "the practice [of conducting hearings in public] is an
effective guarantee against arbitrary methods in the conduct of hearings. Star
Chamber methods cannot thrive where hearings are open to the scrutiny of all."8s2
While the Supreme Court has never expressly ruled in an administrative
setting that due process may require an open and public hearing, the same has,
at least, been implied. In Morgan v. United States,83 Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for a majority of the Court, noted in dictum that the "rudimentary
requirements of fair play... demand 'a fair and open hearing,'--essential alike
to the legal validity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of
public confidence . . . ."4 In addition, the Court held in FCC v. Schrcibcr83
that the denial of a request for a closed hearing was not an abuse of discretion
in view of a "general policy favoring disclosure of administrative proceedings."80
In Fitzgerald v. Hampton8 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit entertained the question whether an administrative proceeding in which
statutory employment rights hang in the balance must be open and public. The
court resolved this question in the affirmative.88
As a threshhold matter the court was faced with the defense assertion that
not only was Fitzgerald not entitled to a hearing with "'all the attributes of a
criminal trial,"' but also that he was entitled to no hearing at all, at least as
of right, since the stated ground for his separation had been a routine reductionin-force.89 The court noted, however, that:
Were we to look no further than the stated reason for an employee's separation, not
only could an agency cavalierly discharge preference eligibles under the guise of a
sentence, on the ground that the defendant's testimony did not "jell" with that of another
witness. The "grand jury" proceeding and the "trial" for contempt were both conducted in
secret. Id. at 259. This, the Supreme Court decided, had been a denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 273.
80. Davis, Treatise § 8.09, at 551-52.
81. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941).
82. Id. at 68.
83. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
84. Id. at 15.
85. 381 U.S. 279 (1965); accord, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
1970); E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933); cf. FTC v. Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
86. 381 U.S. at 293.
87. 467 Fad 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. Id. at 766.
89. Id. at 758.
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'reduction-in-force,' but under that type of action it could also deprive them of all

adverse action procedural rights to which preference eligibles are entitled, including
the right to a hearing. 90

Here, Fitzgerald was contesting the matter. Thus, the court felt it appropriate
to apply by analogy the rationale of the "coerced resignation" caseso-concluding that since Fitzgerald 92had "nonfrivolously" alleged wrongful discharge he
should be granted a hearing.
The court decided that Fitzgerald was entitled to due process because his
employment was under "legislative protection. '9 3 That is, as a preference eligible
no adverse action could be taken against him "'except for a cause which will
promote the efficiency of the service.' "4 "We hold," said the court, "that the
statutory employment rights of Fitzgerald are within the liberty and property
concept of the Fifth Amendment and sufficient for him, as a preference eligible
employee, to invoke the due process clause."95,
Having determined that Fitzgerald was entitled to a hearing, and that due
process standards would have to be observed, the court was brought, as it were,
"face to face with the question as to whether procedures which provide that
hearings be closed to the public and press deny [the plaintiff] due process of
law."96
The proceeding before it, the court noted, would determine the merits of
Fitzgerald's claim. 97 Thus it was of an "adjudicatory" or "quasi-judicial" character under the test set forth in Hannah,5 and commanded a stricter standard
of due process. 99 Was a facet of this stricter standard an open and public
hearing? At least in the instant case, it was.10 0 Indeed, broadly read the Fitzgerald case is authority for the meritorious proposition that an open and public
hearing is required by due process in any administrative proceeding which can
properly be characterized as an adjudicatory hearing. "Any lingering doubts,"
said the court, "as to the import of open hearings at the administrative level
should have been put to rest by the Supreme Court's sanction of the 'public
proceedings' in Federal Communications Commission v. Schreiber."'01 Any
doubts which lingered after Schreiber are certainly dispelled by Fitzgerald.
90. Id. at 758-59.
91. Goodman v. United States, 358 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dabney v. Freeman,
358 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Paroczay v. Hodges, 297 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1961). These
cases held that an employee who had resigned his position and thereby given up his employment rights would nevertheless be entitled to a hearing on the question of whether his
resignation had been coerced, provided allegations made by him to that effect were "nonfrivolous."
92. 467 F.2d at 760.
93. Id. at 762.
94. Id., referring to 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1970).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 762-63.
97. 467 F.2d at 766.
98. Id.; see text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
99. 467 F.2d at 766.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 764 (italics added); see text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.

1973]

CASE NOTES

1015

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Religion-Regulations Compelling Chapel
Attendance at Military Academies Held Invalid.-Plaintiffs, two West Point
cadets and nine Annapolis midshipmen, brought a class action1 on behalf of
all cadets attending the United States Military, Naval and Air Force Academies, 2 challenging the validity of regulations 3 requiring chapel attendance
on Sundays. Such regulations, it was contended, were violative of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment 4 and of the "religious
test" prohibition of article VI of the Constitution. 5 The district court, finding
the regulations to be valid, denied plaintiffs' motions for declaratory and

injunctive relief.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed in a per curiam decision,7 with two judges writing
separately for reversal and one judge dissenting. It was agreed by the concurring judges that the establishment clause had been violated.8 Anderson
v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
The meaning of the establishment clause was not fully considered0 by the
1. Anderson v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd per curiam, 466
F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. CL 690 (1972).
2. Although no Air Force Academy cadet was a named plaintiff, the similarity of regulations and of cadet positions at the three service academies was deemed sufficient to bring
the Air Force Academy into the suit, which the district court held to be a class action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Id. at 1083 n.3.
3. Regulations for The United States Cadet Corps of the United States Military Academy,
ch. 8, § IV, 819; Air Force Cadet Regulation No. 265-1; United States Naval Academy
Regulations pt. II, ch. 15, § 1501. Violations of the regulations are punished. 466 F.2d at
284. The regulations are mandatory on their face although it is the stated policy of the
Academies that exceptions can be made for individual cadets with "sincerely held convictions" against attendance. The Eleventh Conference of Superintendents of the Academies of
the Armed Forces, Record of Proceedings, April 18, 1969 at 32. The Court of Appeals noted
that in the last forty years only three Naval Academy midshipmen had been excused from
attendance while no West Point Cadet had ever been excused. 466 F.2d at 284-85 n.5. In
1969 four West Point cadets who sought to be excused were labeled "troublemakers." 466
F.2d at 302.
4. U.S. Const. amend. I provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . ..."
5. U.S. Const. art. VI provides, in part: "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."
6. 316 F. Supp. at 1093.
7. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
8. The view was also expressed by one concurring judge that the free exercise clause
had been violated. See text accompanying notes 58 and 68-71 infra.
9. The few pre-Everson cases dealing with the establishment clause were decided on
narrow grounds, Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81 (1908) (agreement to make payments to the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions for the education of certain Sioux Indians
upheld on the ground that the payments were not "gratuitous appropriations of public
money" but treaty debts); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 US. 291, 298-99 (1899) (agreement
to finance construction of a hospital run by Roman Catholic nuns sustained on the ground
that the hospital was a "corporation" and not a "sectarian body"), discussed in 45 Mich. L.
Rev. 1001, 1006 (1947); or in summary fashion, Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.. 366,
389-90 (1918) (the contention that exemption provisions in the Act violated the religion
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Supreme Court until the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education.'0 Challenged in Everson was a New Jersey statute" allowing reimbursement of
transportation costs to the parents of parochial school children. The validity
of the statute was sustained by the Court.1 2 Justice Black, speaking for the
majority, declared in broad terms that:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion ....
In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
"a wall of separation between church and State."' 8
It appeared, however, that this "wall of separation" was not impenetrable. Upon
closer scrutiny of the particular facts before it, the Court further submitted
that the first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers .... " 1 4 This neutral posture,
the Court felt, had not been departed from by the challenged program because
the program did no more to aid religious schools than do "such general
government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for
sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks."'1 In fact the program was aimed
not at the schools but at the school children; it was a "general program to
help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."' 0 Thus, as commentators later
explained, the New Jersey statute had a "secular purpose"; 17 and for that
reason was not invalidated despite "incidental aid to religion."' 8
clauses thought to be so unsound as to require nothing more than a statement to that effect);
or were not technically concerned with the establishment clause, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (dictum to the effect that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the
establishment clause); Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930)

(Louisiana statute

providing textbooks without charge to all school children, including those attending parochial
schools, upheld on fourteenth amendment grounds). At the time of Cochran the establishment clause was not binding upon the states. See, e.g., Duval, The Constitutionality of State
Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 342, 343. But cf.
Sutherland, Establishment of Religion-1968, 19 Case NV. Res. L. Rev. 469, 487-88 (1968).

See generally Manning, Aid to Education-Federal Fashion, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 495, 513-16
(1961).
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 18:14-8 (1937).
12. 330 U.S. at 17.
13. Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 17-18.
16. Id. at 18.
17. See, e.g., Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1970); Sutherland, Establishment of Religion-1968,
19 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 469, 486 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1970).
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Within a year the Court was presented with another suit grounded in the
establishment clause-this time challenging a program whereby private groups
were allowed to conduct religious education classes in Illinois public schools
during school hours. In Ilinois ex rel. McCoUum v. Board of Education,19 the
Court struck down the arrangement on the rationale that it fell "squarely
under the ban of the First Amendment... as we interpreted it in Everson v.
Board of Education."20 In 1952, however, the Court sustained a program of
"released time" religious instruction in which classes were not held on public
school premises, distinguishing the McCollun case.21 In Zorach v. Clauson," 2
Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, noted:
The First Amendment... does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the
other.23
Want of "separation," if such it could be called, was not fatal to the program
under consideration because it was not the purpose of the amendment to create
governmental "hostility" to religion. 24 "We are," the Court declared,
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. . . .When the
state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. 25
While the Zorach decision shed new light on the "neutrality" concept, what
was newly seen did not fail to create some surprise2 0 If the Court had seemed
to waiver, however, in its determination to resist admixture of things ecclesiastical and governmental, this notion was dispelled by a series of decisions
handed down in the early 1960's.
Declaring that "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally . . . pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against non-believers," and adding that "neither can aid those religions based
on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different
19. 333 US. 203 (1948).
20. Id. at 210.
21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-09, 315 (1952). The Court said: "In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the public
school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public schools do
no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction.
We follow the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present released time
program ... 21Id. at 315 (italics omitted) (footnote omitted).
22.
23.

343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 312.

24. Id. at 314. "[W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the
effective scope of religious influence." Id.
25. Id. at 313-14.
26. See Hudspeth, Separation of Church and State in America, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 1035,
1052-53 (1955); Manning, supra note 9, at 495.
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the Court in Torcaso v. Watkins28 invalidated a Maryland test oath

requiring declaration of belief in God as a prerequisite for certain public
appointments. 29 In Engel v. Vitale,80 the Court one year later ended the
practice of reciting in New York public schools a "nondenominational" prayer
composed by the State Board of Regents.31 Bible reading in the public schools
of Pennsylvania was subjected to a similar fate in the 1963 case of School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp.8 2
The Schempp decision is important because it articulated a specific test for
establishment clause transgressions. The "secular purpose" rationale discerned
in Everson became the "purpose and effect" test.88
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
84
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

Characterizing as "religious" the Bible reading exercises before it, the Court
in Sckempp found that by the terms it had set up, such exercises did in fact
violate the strictures of the establishment clause, constituting a departure from
the "strict neutrality" which the government had been commanded to
maintain.8 5
In 1968 the Court in Board of Education v. Allen 88 utilized the Schempp
test to sustain a New York statute 7 which provided for the lending of secular
textbooks to all students in grades seven through twelve-including students
in parochial schools.88 In 1970, in Walz v. Tax Commission, 9 the Court
27. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
28. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
29. Id. at 496. Torcaso, after his appointment to the office of Notary Public by the
Governor of Maryland, was not allowed to serve because of his refusal to comply with a
provision of the Maryland Constitution requiring "'as a qualification for any office of profit
or trust'" declaration of belief in God. Id. at 489.
30. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
31. Id. at 424. The prayer read as follows: "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy Blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country.'" Id. at 422.
32. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971), wherein Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, warned of the "risks In
treating criteria discussed by the Court from time to time as 'tests' in any limiting sense
of that term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes of the physical
sciences or mathematics. The standards should rather be viewed as guidelines with which
to identify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses have been impaired."
Id. at 678.
34. 374 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 225.
36. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
37. N.Y. Educ. Law § 701(3) (McKinney 1969).

38. 392 U.S. at 238. Speaking of the statute's "effect" the Court noted that "the finan-
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0

for properties used exclusively

sustained a New York property tax exemption

for religious purposes. In so deciding the Court added 4 ' yet another criterion
for determining establishment clause violation: that the "end result [must not
be] an excessive government entanglement with religion.2 4 2 The Valz Court
also explored more fully the relation of the two religion clauses of the first
amendment, noting that it had struggled to chart a course of "constitutional
neutrality" between the two clauses so as to accomplish the basic purposes of
both: viz., "to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded,

and none inhibited."

43

At the same time it was developing these concepts, the Supreme Court
consistently made dear that activities otherwise proscribed by the establishment clause would not be saved from invalidity by provisions allowing objecting individuals in one way or another to avoid them. Thus, the fact that
students could be excused upon parental request from the Bible readings at
issue in Schempp did not deter the Court from declaring those ceremonies
unlawful.4" A similar conclusion had been reached in Engel, the "Regents
prayer" case. There the Court pointed out that
[t]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
47
laws ... whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.

In Anderson v. Laird, the district court refused to enjoin mandatory chapel
cial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools." Id. at 244 (footnote omitted). In this
respect the logic of the decision resembled that advanced in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) ; see text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
39. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40. The Court noted that the exemption did not apply exclusively to any one religion or
to religious groups as such but "to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of
property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations .... " Id. at 673.
41. The Waiz decision was unclear as to whether "excessive entanglement" was an addition to the "purpose and effect" test set forth in Schempp, or merely a refinement of
Schempp's "effect" aspect. See id. at 674. However, the Court itself subsequently avowed
that the former was true. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602, 612-13 (1971), noted in 40
Fordham L. Rev. 371 (1971).
42. 397 U.S. at 674. In characteristic fashion the Court made clear that "[tlhe test is
... one of degree." Id. It explained that while both taxation and exemption from taxation
of church properties entail some degree of state involvement, such involvement in the case
of taxation would tend to be more extensive, "giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in
the train of those legal processes." Id.
43. Id. at 669.
44. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
45. 374 U.S. at 224-25. The Court declared: "[A] violation of the Free Exercise Clause
is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended."
Id. at 223.
46. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
47. 370 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added).
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regulations of the nation's service academies. 48 In so deciding the court was
persuaded both by the long tradition which such regulations had enjoyed-"an
unbroken pattern of 150 years of mandatory chapel under the eyes of the
President and the Congress" 4 9-- and by their military context. These were
training regulations, the court emphasized; 50 and the consequences of this
characterization were twofold. On the one hand, judicial interference was
thereby discouraged. "[TIhe amount of deference given the military in matters
of discipline and training should be wide." 5' 1 On the other hand, the conclusion
that these were training regulations carried them safely beyond the bounds
of the Sckempp test. 12 Mandatory chapel, the court found, had as its sole
purpose and primary effect not the inculcation of religious faith or motivation,
but the development in future officers of a "sensitivity to the spiritual needs
of men in times of combat crisis." 5 3
The court was able to make this finding by virtue of a distinction it had
earlier drawn between mere attendance at church or chapel and worship. This
proved to be a crucial distinction indeed.64 For not only did it dispose of
"establishment" problems, it enabled the court as well to deal with the free
exercise clause. It eliminated the element of coercion. "The cadets," said the
court, "are required only to attend church or chapel services . .. they are
not required to participate in the service or to worship. The choice is left to each
individual." 5
Mandatory chapel met its end at the appellate level. In a per curiam opinion,
brief enough to be reproduced here in full, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court.50 It noted:
48. 316 F. Supp. at 1093.
49. Id. at 1087. On this point Mr. Justice Holmes was quoted by the court from his
opinion in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922), wherein he said: "'[I lf a
thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.'" Id. at 1088.
50. This was a position the Government pressed throughout the case. Indeed, Circuit
Judge Leventhal noted in his opinion on the appeal that: "In this litigation, the Government stands on the Chapel Attendance Statement adopted in 1969 by the Superintendents
of the four Service Academies, which focuses on the requirment in training terms." 466
F.2d at 300 (concurring opinion) (footnote omitted).
51. 316 F. Supp. 1085-86.
52. Id. at 1088-92. Although the Walz case was variously cited, there was no mention
in the district court's opinion of "entanglement" and the test which was in fact applied was
for "purpose" and "effect." Id.
53. Id. at 1089.
54. Summing up, the court noted that it "first makes the necessary distinction between
'attendance' and 'worship' and holds that attendance under the circumstances in question
does not constitute worship. While this distinction might be said to be slight, it is in this
case crucial." Id. at 1091.
55. Id. at 1088, 1091 n.9. The court also decided that the "religious test" prohibition of
article VI had not been violated. Id. at 1092-93. Noting the "close connection between the
establishment prohibition and the test oath prohibition," the court concluded that since no
transgression of the former had occurred, it followed that the same could be said of the
latter. Id. at 93.
56. 466 F.2d 283-84. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. 409 U.S.
1076 (1972).
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The separate opinions of Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit Judge Leventhal concur in
the conclusion that the judgment of the District Court, denying appellants' motions for
declaratory and injunctive relief against compulsory chapel attendance at the military
academies should be reversed. The case is remanded for the entry of an appropriate
order. Circuit Judge MacKinnon dissents. 57
Chief Judge Bazelon, in his separate opinion, was of the view that both the
establishment and free exercise clauses had been contravened by the mandatory
chapel regulations.58 Turning first to the establishment clause, the Judge concluded from a review of its history that that provision had been written to
abolish "specific Governmental practices," salient among which was "governmental compulsion of church attendance."59 Moreover, the Supreme Court in
its interpretation of the establishment clause had long adhered to the principle,
set forth in Everson,6 that government may neither " 'force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will.' "0
The tests which the district court had applied, to ascertain the "purpose and
effect" of the regulations, 2 Judge Bazelon felt to be inapposite. "Purpose" and
"effect" were properly looked into, the Judge said, only where there was some
ambiguity as to the nature of the activity at issue, i.e., as to whether or not it
was a "religious" activity.63 But there was no ambiguity here. Compelling
attendance was an integral part of compelling worship, for how else could
worship be compelled than by "compelling certain overt actions"?" "[T]here
are," Judge Bazelon concluded, "certain forms of governmental involvement
with religion which the Establishment Clause prohibits absolutely."Ca5 Compulsory attendance at religious ceremonies, the Judge felt, was one of these.
Furthermore, it was by virtue of this fact that the military context of the
involvement did not relieve it of the onus of constitutional restrictions. "The
military regulations in this case violate the core value of the Establishment
Clause and completely abolish its protection. Therefore, judicial action is
mandated now." 6 6
Given this reasoning, the factual inquiry which the district court had made
as to the effect and purpose of mandatory chapel was, from an establishment
point of view, "unnecessary." 67 However, what was important on the factual
level was the question whether there had been coercion. Looking to the record,
Judge Bazelon found sufficient coercion 68 in the chapel regulations to constitute
57. 466 F.2d at 283-84.
58. Id. at 284 (concurring opinion).
59. Id. at 287 (concurring opinion).
60. See notes 10-18 supra and accompanying text.
61. 466 F.2d at 288 (concurring opinion) (quoting Everson).
62. 316 F. Supp. at 1087, 1088-91.
63. 466 F.2d at 291 (concurring opinion).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 290.
66. Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 294.
68. Id. at 296. Quoting from Schempp, Judge Bazelon said: "'The Free Exercise Clause
...withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on
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69

"manifest restraints" on the free exercise of religion. Relying on Sherbert v.
Verner,70 he noted that such restraints could be constitutionally justified only
if the regulations were enacted to serve "compelling state interests" and if
there were no alternative means of achieving the government's71 goals. Such a
showing, the Judge concluded, had not been made in this case.
Judge Leventhal, in his separate opinion, argued that the compelling state
interest test ought to have been applied by Judge Bazelon to the establishment
aspect of the case, as well. He wrote:
As I understand it, [Judge Bazelon's] view is that the compulsory chapel-church
attendance requirement is per se a violation of the Establishment Clause. .

.

. It

suffices, in my view, that an Academy regulation requiring chapel-church attendance is,
at the very least, presumptively invalid as a measure respecting an establishment of
religion, and that there is no showing that such an infringement 72of First Amendment
liberties is unavoidably required on ground of military necessity.
This, however, was not to say that, had a compelling interest in fact been
shown, Judge Leventhal would have sustained the regulations. It was to say
only that whether mandatory chapel is per se violative of the establishment
clause was "a more difficult question than this case require[d to] be answered." 73
Presumptive invalidity, "at the very least," could be used as a measure, and
since that presumption could not be overcome there was no need of proceeding
further. 74 In a similar vein, having determined that the regulations under
attack were invalid on establishment grounds, the Judge declined to embark
75
on a free exercise analysis.
What is important, it seems, in Judge Leventhal's reasoning is what he found
the free exercise of religion ...

[a] violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated

on coercion . . . .'" Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
69. Coercion was said to exist because violations of the regulations were punished; there
was peer pressure to conform; students could attend only "approved" alternatives which
were non-existent for certain minorities; in order to change affiliations, consent of parents
and chaplain were required; and "visitation of a variety of religious services, [was] absolutely prohibited." Id. at 296.
70. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist who was discharged from
her employment for refusing to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath, and who for that reason
was also unable to obtain other employment, was denied unemployment compensation on
the grounds that she had failed to accept suitable employment offered to her. The Supreme
Court held that this imposed a "burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion." Id. at
403. The Supreme Court said that if such was to be tolerated there would have to be a
showing of a "compelling state interest" to justify such a burden and, moreover, of a want
of alternative measures to satisfy the compelling state interest. Id. at 406-07.
71. 466 F.2d at 296-97 (concurring opinion).
72. Id. at 297 (concurring opinion).
73. Id. Judge Bazelon, on the other hand, correctly indicated that no Supreme Court
opinion had referred to compelling state interests as justifying imposition by government of
activities otherwise proscribed by the establishment clause. Id. at 290 (concurring opinion).
74. Id. at 297 (concurring opinion).
75. Id. Like Judge Bazelon, Judge Leventhal expressed no opinion on the appellants'
article VI contention.
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in mandatory chapel to inspire the presumption of invalidity. It was the absence
of "voluntarism. '76 "The Establishment Clause," he said, "assures that the
exercise of religion will be truly free-will be voluntary, and not imposed.""
The mere provision of property, facilities, and personnel in order to allow
attendance at religious services, given the "special position of the military and
needs of its often isolated personnel" does not, said the Judge, constitute an
"excessive entanglement" with religion, "assuming the core element of voluntarism on the part of the attending military personnel."78 This critical element
the chapel regulations lacked by definition.
Judge MacKinnon in his dissenting opinion agreed with the district court
that the military aspect of Anderson was crucial. This, he said,
makes it impossible to consider this case as merely a sterile regulation requiring a
group of people to attend religious services. These regulations must be examined
through the overlay of their importance in properly effectuating the constitutionally
recognized power of the armed services to train the necessary personnel to adequately
defend this Nation 79
The Judge felt that the first amendment effects of the regulations were "de
ininimis."8 0 Attendance, he said, was distinguishable from worship; what was
sought was merely exposure to religion. 8 ' The judgement of military experts
ought generally to be afforded great weight, and in this particular theirs was
a very correct judgment. The Judge concluded: [T]rying to give a person an
attending
understanding of the moral force and motivation of religion 8without
2
church is like trying [to] teach swimming without water."
The essentiality of the attendance-worship distinction to the argument in support of mandatory chapel regulations cannot be doubted. Those who refused to
accept the distinction were those at whose hands the regulations fell;" a and
those who would have preserved the regulations were adamant in their support
of the distinction." However, it seems true that no one would press such a
distinction in any context other than that in which the Anderson case arose 8 76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 298 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Judge Leventhal argued that this
"special position of the military" affected the establishment clause, and allows such provision.
Id. Judge Bazelon disagreed and said that such "accommodation of the Establishment
Clause ...is necessitated not by military interests, but by the mandate of the Free Exercise
Clause that soldiers be given the opportunity to worship." Id. at 290 n.36 (concurring opinion).
The dissent struck a position midway between the two concurring opinions and argued that
in this context the establishment clause was modified both by the free exercise clause and the
nation's military power. Id. at 310-15 (dissenting opinion).
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 315.
83. Id. at 291 (concurring opinion); Id. at 299-301 (concurring opinion).
84. 466 F.2d at 311 (dissenting opinion) ; 316 F. Supp. at 1091.
85. As Judge MacKinnon pointed out: "[T]he overriding factual difference in this case
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Thus it might be said that Anderson really reduces to an exploration of the
freedom of religion guarantee vis-A-vis the military. While in the past the
Supreme Court has made clear that certain other Bill of Rights guarantees
must "bend" to the exigencies of military service,80 nothing specific has been
said by the Court with respect to the area in question. Anderson, therefore,

represents the view of at least one federal appellate court that in a confrontation between the congressional military powers and the religious freedom
clauses, the force and effect of the latter will not lightly be diminished.

Constitutional Law-Freedom of the Press-Newsmen Held to Possess
No Testimonial Privilege. With Respect to Confidential Communications.

-Petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respondent Caldwell, three newsmen,
were in separate instances cited for contempt for refusing to testify before grand
juries concerning information received in confidence in the course of their newsgathering activities. Branzburg had on two occasions declined to give testimony
regarding persons involved in a local "drug scene" about which he had written;'
Pappas 2 and Caldwell 3 withheld information garnered in their investigations of
the Black Panther movement. The reporters argued that to force them to reveal
derives from the crucial role these educational institutions play in our military establishment."
466 F.2d at 306 (dissenting opinion).
86. E.g., the sixth amendment right of trial by jury has been held not applicable to
trials by courts-martial. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950) ; Kahn v. Anderson,
255 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1921). As Chief Justice Vinson noted in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 337
(1953), "the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty ...." Id. at 140 (plurality opinion). Justices
Reed, Burton and Clark joined in this opinion.
1. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), concerned a reporter for a Louisville newspaper who had written in-depth articles on the drug
culture. In response to two separate grand jury subpoenas, he refused to testify, claiming immunity under a Kentucky reporters' privilege statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. 1972), the first amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Kentucky State Constitution.
2. In re Pappas, - Mass. -, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), arose
when the petitioner, a television news reporter, was allowed to enter Black Panther Party
headquarters on the condition that he not reveal what he saw or heard. His claim of immunity
was based on the first amendment.
3. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
concerned a black New York Times reporter who was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury
for information and tapes he had acquired while in the confidence of the Black Panthers. His
contempt order for refusal to testify to the grand jury was reversed by the court of appeals, which held that the first amendment provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen. The court reasoned that requiring reporters to testify, absent compelling reasons, would
discourage informants from communicating with them in the future and would tend to make
reporters censor their writings to avoid subpoenas.
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their confidences would have the effect of deterring potential information sources
and of enforcing upon newsmen a kind of self censorship, "all to the detriment
of the free flow of information protected by the First Amendment." 4 The United
States Supreme Court held, in a 5 to 4 decision, that the first amendment provides newsmen with no professional privilege exempting them from revealing
confidential material to a grand jury or at a criminal trial. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Under the maxim that "the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,"15 no testimonial privilege for newsmen was recognized at common law. 6
As early as 1874, in People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher,7 a court held that it had
the power to imprison a reporter until he agreed to respond to the questions of

a grand jury.8 Although in time newspapermen began to claim with greater fre-

quency an actual privilege exempting them from disclosing confidential information,9 such claims found little favor with the judiciary. To the assertion that it
was a "canon of journalistic ethics" not to disclose confidences, the courts were
quick to reply that such a canon must be subservient to the public interest and
to the administration of justice. 10
In response to public demand, state legislatures begun to pass statutes extending to newsmen the privilege which the courts had consistently withheld."t Even
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972). For a discussion of newsmen's rights, see
Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64
Nw. U.L. Rev. 18 (1969); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 Colum. L.
Rev. 838 (1971); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right To A Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317 (1970).
.5* 8 J. VWigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton 1961). Wigmore further states:
"In general, then, the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence, or
in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege.
...No pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a
court of justice." Id. § 2286, at 528.
6. Generally, courts have held that there is no privilege before a state senate (Ex parte
Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897)), before a police commission with the power of
contempt (Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911)), before the taking of a
deposition (Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969)), or before a grand
jury (People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936)).
7. 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
8. Id. The grand jury was attempting to ascertain the identity of the author of an
allegedly libellous article. The defendant's refusal to testify was not based upon an asserted
privilege, but upon his belief that the responsibility for disclosure of the information belonged
to the newspaper. Id. at 227.
9. See In re Grunow, 84 N.JL. 235, 236, 85 A. 1011, 1012 (1913). See also Joslyn v.
People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291,
295, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (1936).

10. See, e.g., Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950).
11. See generally Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure oi Confidential
Sources and Information, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 667 (1971); Note, The Newsmans Privilege:
Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 Calif. L. Rev.
1198 (1970).
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the force of them was often limited by
where such statutes existed, however,
12
narrow construction in the case law.
In 1958 it was urged for the first time that a reporter's privilege was protected
by the freedom of press guarantee of the first amendment. In Garlandv. Torre,'3
the singer Judy Garland brought suit on the basis of alleged defamatory statements made concerning her by "a network executive" to a newspaper reporter.
discovery, the reporter
When asked the identity of that executive during pretrial
14
refused to answer, claiming a first amendment right.
The reporter argued that the right to "freedom of the press" entailed as a
corollary the right of newsmen to gather news, and to keep sources to themselves,
in order to ensure the unrestricted flow of news to the public.'0 This right was
viewed as analogous to rights hitherto held essential to press freedom: the right
to publish without prior censorship; 16 the right of circulation;' 7 the right to
distribute literature;' 8 and the right to receive printed matter.'9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "compulsory disclosure
of a journalist's confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment
20
of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news."
Nonetheless, the court found that freedom of the press was not absolute and
that it must give way to a "paramount public interest in the fair administration
of justice."' 2 1 The court asserted moreover that it had before it neither a situation
in which it was asked to direct a "wholesale disclosure" of a newspaper's sources,
nor one in which the source demanded was of "doubtful relevance or materiality."
2 2"Rather, the information sought went to the "heart of the plaintiff's claim."
Some state courts refused, in the wake of Torre, to acknowledge that the
protections of the first amendment extended to a reporter's sources.23 In State v.
12. See, e.g., Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print. & Publ. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197
A.2d 416 (1964); State v. Donovan, 192 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
13. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 910 (1958).
14. The first amendment provides, in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .. . . " U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has
held that this protection also extends to legislative and judicial proceedings. Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957).
15. For additional discussion of this point, see notes 34, 55-57 infra and accompanying
text.
16. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
17. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
18. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943).
19. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
20. 259 F.2d at 548 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 549.
22. Id. at 550 (emphasis added). See also In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d
472 (1961).
23. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). The case concerned a grand
jury investigation into corruption of the Philadelphia city government. Ultimately, the reporter did not have to testify because of a Pennsylvania statute. See also notes 1 & 2 supra.
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Buchanan,24 the Oregon Supreme Court in 1968 presented several cogent reasons
for this stance. Acknowledging that a reporter had neither a statutory25 nor a
common law 26 privilege, the court held that the press had no right to information
not generally available to the public, and that freedoms of privacy and association as well as ethical convictions must yield to the duty of every citizen to give
testimony 2 7 The court also noted the possibility of infringement of certain
constitutional rights, such as that contained in the Equal Protection Clause,
where special testimonial rights are assigned to newsmen. Finally, the court observed that it would be dangerous for the government to attempt to regulate the
granting of press credentials, because the concept of "press" includes respectable newspapers as well as disreputable ones, and free-lance writers as well
as pamphleteers.2 s
In 1970, however, the trend appeared to turn in favor of the recognition of a
reporter's privilege. A federal district court in In re Grand Jury Witncse$m was
the first court explicitly to deal with the privilege. Although the court eventually
required the reporter before it to testify to the grand jury, it first ruled that
the government must show a "compelling and overriding national interest in
requiring the testimony of respondents which cannot be served by any alter30
native means."1

A few months later, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v.
United States3' also decided in favor of a reporter's privilege, holding that the
government must demonstrate "a compelling need for the witness's presence
before judicial process properly can issue to require attendance." 32 The government had argued that press freedoms were not endangered because groups such
as the Black Panthers were dependent upon the media to maintain themselves in
the public eye and therefore would disclose information without a promise of
confidentiality. Furthermore, even if confidential sources were constricted, the
press could still inform the public through press releases and other means of
reporting. The court of appeals rejected these contentions, stating that the first
24. 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 US. 905 (1968). The case concerned
the subpoena of a contributor to a student newspaper who had written an article about the
use of marijuana by seven persons.
25. Id. at 246, 436 P.2d at 729-30 citing Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.040 (1972), which lists such
privileges as husband and wife, attorney and client, priest and penitent, physician and patient, public officer and official communication, stenographer and employer, professional
nurse and patient, certified psychologist and client.
26. The privilege was recognized at common law only for the priest, physician and lawyer,

and it was the contents of the communication, and not the identity of the declarant that
was privileged. 250 Ore. at 246 n.4, 436 P.2d at 731 n.4.
27. Id. at 248, 436 P.2d at 731.
28. Id. at 249-50, 436 P.2d at 731-32.
29. 322 F. Supp. 573 (ND. Cal. 1970). The case concerned the testimony of two professional journalists employed by the Black Panther newspaper.
30. Id. at 574; see State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
31. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see text accompanying
note 3 supra.
32. Id. at 1089 (footnotes omitted).
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amendment has as its purpose the preservation of "an 'untrammeled press as a
vital source of public information.' "33
In Branzburg, Justice White responded3 4 that the first amendment does not
preclude "every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes .... .," The Court noted that the press is
neither immune from reasonable business regulations, 30 nor from libel laws.

7

Moreover, the first amendment does not grant special access to gather information to the press above that available to the general public.38
Alternatively, it was emphasized that the first amendment interest asserted by
the reporters "was outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear
before a grand jury or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information
he possesses." 39
The Supreme Court noted that the main arguments of those seeking a constitutional privilege were based on a line of cases holding that the infringement of
protected first amendment rights must be no broader than necessary to achieve
a permissible governmental purpose.4 0 However, requiring reporters to testify
33. Id. at 1084, citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 279 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
34. The high Court reversed United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
and affirmed Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970) and In re Pappas, - Mass.
-, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). A recent court of appeals decision, Baker v. F & F Inv.,
470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), declined to extend the Branzburg ruling to cover civil
cases.
35. 408 U.S. at 682.
36. Id. at 683; see Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
250 (1936).
37. 408 U.S. at 683-84, citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
38. 408 U.S. at 684; see Tribune Review Pub]. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3d
Cir. 1958) (forbidding pictures in the court); United Press Assoc. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71,
77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954) (clearing the court of the public). The Court also noted that
the press is barred from grand jury proceedings, Supreme Court deliberations, meetings of
official bodies, and meetings of private organizations. 408 U.S. at 684. Moreover, newsmen
"may be prohibited from or publishing information about trials, if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial court." Id. at 685; see Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
39. 408 U.S. at 686. The grand jury, it was noted, held a high place in our system of
justice as the only procedure of bringing charges of serious crimes. Id. at 687-88; see Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 489-90 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). To carry out this
important role, the power to subpoena witnesses and hear their testimony was considered
both historic and necessary. In addition, the Court noted that the evidence failed to show
that there would be a significant reduction of the flow of news to the public, if the privilege
to newsmen were denied. 408 U.S. at 693.
40. Id. at 680-81, citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943);
Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966). See generally Note, Reporters and Their Sources:
The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317 (1970).
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involved no direct restrictions on freedoms of speech, press or assembly. 41 Observing that the government must show a compelling interest where first amendment rights are even indirectly burdened,4 the Court reasoned that this test had
been met because "the investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a
fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property
of the citizen ....

-43

Justice White stated that the available evidence did not prove the reporters'
contention that denial of a privilege would constrict the "flow of news to the
public." 4 The Court also asserted that, in any case, the conditional privilege
claimed by the reporters could not be effective, given the sensitivity of the
sources upon which the conditional privilege was based. Even if a conditional
privilege could be effective, the administration of the privilege by the courts
"would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.""4 The
courts would be forced to distinguish between those who could validly be considered newsmen and those who could not. Moreover, if a "compelling interest"
was to be a central part of the conditional privilege, as argued by petitioners,
the courts would of necessity become involved in the most intricate of legal
determinations in the application of the test. 46
While the Court would not recognize a privilege for these reasons, it expressly
noted that the power of the grand jury was not without limits. Official harassment and bad faith investigation, Justice White stated, would not be justified,
and judges would exercise control to prevent such conduct from occurring. 47
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that the majority
decision was limited, holding only that the claimed privilege should be judged
by balancing the interests of freedom of the press with the obligations of all
citizens to give pertinent testimony with respect to criminal activity. 48 Moreover, he noted that even if reporters were required to testify, they could
41.

408 U.S. at 681.

42. Id. at 680, citing DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
43. 408 U.S. at 700. The Supreme Court thought it was obvious that the government's
interest in fighting crime had met the test set forth in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm.,
372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963), that the government "'convincingly show a substantial relation
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interes'"
Id. Finally, the Court was unwilling to set the judiciary upon the arduous task of administering a "constitutional newsman's privilege." If a qualified privilege were granted, once a
reporter were subpoenaed, questions would arise as to probable cause, whether the reporter
actually had useful information, whether the grand jury could obtain the information from
other sources, and lastly, whether the government interest should take precedence over the
claimed constitutional privilege. Id. at 705-06; see text accompanying note 64 infra.
44. Id. at 693.
45. Id. at 703-04.
46. Id at 705-06. See also note 43 supra.
47.

Id at 707-08.

48. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). But the majority seemed to reject this method.
See id. at 702-04 n.39.
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receive a protective order from the court if the investigation was not made in
good faith. Motions to quash would also be upheld if the information sought was
immaterial or irrelevant,49or if the government did not have a real need for the
confidential information.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, was of the view that reporters not only may
not be compelled to testify before a grand jury, but need not even appear since
their privilege is complete and absolute. He felt that there was no "compelling
need" that could be shown to qualify this privilege before a grand jury.50 Justice
Douglas claimed that both the New York Times and the government in trying
to balance first amendment freedoms against other interests of the government,
were advancing a "timid, watered-down, emasculated" view of the amendment."1
In a number of recent cases, he noted, the Supreme Court had stated that any
regulations in areas concerning the first amendment must be "narrowly drawn"
and "compelling," and not merely "rational" as in other areas of regulation.""
Despite these precedents, the majority opinion, in Justice Douglas' view, in
effect would allow a reporter to be brought before a grand jury solely in order
to expose his political ideas. 3 Furthermore, Justice Douglas warned that if the
"compelling interest" test were found to be satisfied in this case, it would create
a serious danger that the test would thereby become so elastic as to be of no use
as a first amendment protection."4
In another dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, decried what he found to be an undermining of the "historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an
investigative arm of government." 55 He contended that without freedom to
gather information, the right to publish would be compromised 0 and that a
49. Id. at 710.
50. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 713. Mr. Justice Douglas stated that two first amendment principles were at
issue. The first was that the people should have absolute freedom and thus privacy of their
personal opinions and beliefs. Here Caldwell's position as a reporter is not as Important as
one who is seeking to formulate his own intellectual opinions. The second principle asserted was that in order for effective self-government to succeed, the people must have a
steady and unhampered flow of information and opinion. It was here that Caldwell's role as
a reporter became extremely important. Id. at 714-15.

52. See cases cited id. at 716-19 nn.5-8. This "compelling interest" did not refer to regulating one's personal opinions or beliefs, but to his mode of exercising them.
53. 408 U.S. at 719, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
54. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra. Justice Douglas analogized to what lad
happened to the "clear and present danger" test. He stated that "[e]ventually, that formula
was so watered down that the danger had to be neither clear nor present but merely 'not
improbable.'" Id. at 720, citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 490, 510 (1950); see
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. 408 U.S. at 725.
56. "The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his source. This proposition follows as a matter of simple logic once
three factual predicates are recognized: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2)
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person inside government might be afraid to expose corruption in view of possible identification in a subsequent trial or grand jury proceedingY1
The dissent also criticized the majority's contention that the evidence failed
to show that the flow of news would be restricted without a privilege. 18 Mr.
Justice Stewart asserted that the Court could not wait for unequivocal and empirical studies that may never come. 59 Similarly, the dissent attacked the majority's reliance on the importance of the grand jury and the public's right to every
man's evidence. 60 It argued that the rule giving the grand jury "everyone's
evidence" was not absolute. 61 Though the Supreme Court had never considered
the extent to which the first amendment limited grand jury subpoena power, it
has said that" ' [t]he Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms
of governmental action.' "62 Thus, the protections developed in the cases involving governmental investigations should likewise apply to grand jury investi63
gations.

Mr. Justice Stewart proposed certain criteria which should be met when a
reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury:
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is dearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling
and overriding interest in the information. 64
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court made the unfortunate choice of preferring
an expedient method of investigating crime to the public's right to know.Y The
confidentiality-the promise or understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off-the-record-is essential to the creation and maintenance of a newsgathering relationship with informants; and (3) an unbridled subpoena power-the absence
of a constitutional right protecting, in any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory
process--will either deter sources from divulging information or deter reporters from
gathering and publishing information." Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
57. Id. at 731. The dissent also noted that: "[slurveys have verified that an unbridled
subpoena power will substantially impair the flow of news to the public, especially in sensitive areas involving governmental officials, dissidents, or minority groups that require indepth, investigative reporting." Id. at 732-33 (footnote omitted).
58. See notes 39 & 44 supra and accompanying text
59. 408 U.S. at 736.
60. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
61. 408 U.S. at 737. It has been limited by the fifth amendment. Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159 (1950). It has also been limited by the fourth amendment. Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
62. 408 U.S. at 739, quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
63. 408 U.S. at 741. Justice Stewart compared grand jury investigations to those of
legislatures, citing DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1958).
64. 408 U.S. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
65. Surveys have shown the importance of confidential sources to reporters and that
with an untempered subpoena power, the flow of news to the public would be restricted.
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majority emphasized the government's role of investigating crime through the
grand jury,6 6 and de-emphasized the role of the press in our constitutional system.617 In denying the privilege, it placed the burden on the press to show that
the government had overstepped constitutional freedoms.
The argument that the law is entitled to each man's testimony is, as a basis for
the majority's decision,68 something of a paradox. In the name of effective law
enforcement, the criminal justice system will demand a reporter reveal what
knowledge he possesses of criminal activity. It is also apparent that at times the
reporter will have to divulge material other than that relating to a specific
crime because of the grand jury's broad investigatory powers.00 The result will
soon be that the newsman will know nothing of criminal activity since no one will
be inclined to confide in him. Not only will his testimony be valueless, but the
catalytic function of the reporter will be stifled as well. If he cannot protect his
source, he may soon cease making the crime reports which presently provide
70
information to crime fighters and generate support from an aroused public.
Moreover, there is clear evidence that reporters will refuse, at least at present,
71
to testify despite the threat of contempt, as authorized by the majority opinion.
This is hardly conducive to the effective functioning of the grand jury and the
efficient administration of justice.
Justice White suggested that a conditional privilege would not protect reporters against the desertion of sensitive sources; as to that, only an absolute
privilege could be successful. 72 One's suspicion might be aroused by an argument which, in part, justifies its refusal to recognize even a qualified right on
the ground that an absolute right is preferable. In any event, the qualified right
outlined by Justice Stewart would, in fact, provide genuine protection to reporters. 73 In any instance in which a reporter might be requested to testify concerning sensitive material, the government would be required to do more than
show an interest in the material. It would affirmatively have to show probable
cause to believe that the reporter possessed material which was relevant to a
specific crime, which could not be obtained in some other manner, and for
which there was a compelling interest shown. Inevitably, such a strict standard
of proof would induce only a marginal destruction of the reporter's sources, and
at the same time it would allow for the production of testimony in the extraordinary case.
The majority relied to some extent upon the difficulties of interpretation
Blasi, Press Subpoenas: An Empirical and Legal Analysis 6-71 (1971); Guest & Stanzler, The
Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18, 43-50
(1969).
66. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
68. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
69. See 408 U.S. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 746 (Stewart, 3., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Bridge, A Jailed Reporter Tells His Story, Student Law., Dec. 1972, at 11.
72. See 408 U.S. at 702.
73. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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which a qualified privilege would pose for the courts. 74 But, it is asserted, courts
would, in the analysis and application of Justice Stewart's test, face no more
of an insurmountable task in this than in other areas of the law. The definition
of those who would be free to assert the privilege would admittedly be difficult,
but such difficulty hardly disposes of the case. If the right is significant, then
problems of application must be faced. Courts, after all, have not denied the
existence of, for example, the defense of insanity in criminal cases merely because it may be difficult to formulate and apply.7 Nor have the courts hesitated
to set forth a definition of obscenity despite the myriad problems that have resulted. 76 Indeed, even the majority necessarily reserves a significant place for
the interpretative function of courts. The Court takes pains to note the limited
nature of its holding, stating that investigations undertaken in bad faith or for
the purpose of harassment would not be justified, nor would a reporter be compelled to testify in such an investigation. 77 If courts are capable of deciding
that first amendment rights deserve protection in certain cases because the
investigations involved were in "bad faith" and for the purpose of "harassment,"
why do they lack the ability to exercise a similarly interpretive and analytical
approach in the application of Justice Stewart's test?
The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas is not much more persuasive than the
majority opinion. His basic approach is,78 as he argued in New York Times v.
United States"9 and other cases,80 that the first amendment is absolute in nature.
Since the right claimed in Branzburg was, in his view, so useful or essential to
the underlying right of freedom of the press as to be embraced by it, it had to be
absolute as well.8' The Court has never recognized the absolute nature of the
first amendment and it appears late in the day to argue now for the adoption of
that position. Of course, it is possible to recognize that freedom of the press is
not absolute, and yet urge that the reporter's privilege be considered so. Yet
such a view takes little cognizance of the long accepted compelling interest test.
On the one hand, Justice Douglas warns of the possible dilution of the test,
and, on the other, he effectively precludes the application of the test by asserting
that the right involved is absolute. His suggestion that what is involved in this
case is somehow the enforced exposition of private political views is unconvincing.
The decision in Branzburg is perhaps most disturbing because it comes at
74. See note 43 supra. See also text accompanying note 45 supra.
75. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d
812 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
76. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
77. 408 US. at 707-08.
78. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
79. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Douglas, J., joining Black, J., concurring); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 US. 539, 565 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, 3,
dissenting).
81. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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a time in which the vitality and effectiveness of a free press are more necessary
than ever before. The pace and scope of technological, governmental and social
growth have become so great as to virtually smother the individual. Knowledge,
it is said, is power, and it is to the press that the individual must often turn for
knowledge. Clearly, matters such as official corruption or lassitude, social decay,
and rising crime are problems which might well remain hidden without an
effective press. Branzburg will surely decrease the effectiveness of the press, thus
allowing these problems to go untouched. It is, to that extent, a decision especially regrettable at present.

Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure--Carroll Doctrine For Warrantless Search Extended to Chattel Consigned to Common Carrier.-Defendants left five cardboard cartons at a freight counter in San Diego airport for
shipment to Seattle. The air freight agent, suspecting that the cartons contained
contraband, opened one of them and discovered what he believed to be marijuana. The agent notified the police who, upon inspection of the opened carton,
were of the same opinion. The police arrested the defendants and returned to
the air freight office to inspect the remaining four cartons, each of which was
found, like the first, to contain 10 "kilo" bricks of marijuana. Defendants were
charged with transporting marijuana and possession of it for sale,' in violation
of the California Health and Safety Code.2 At trial they moved to suppress the
evidence on the ground that it was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure,"
no warrant having been obtained. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that a "chattel consigned to a
common carrier for shipment may lawfully be searched upon probable cause to
believe it contains contraband." '4 People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d
1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1973) (No. 72-857).
The fourth amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures" 5
1. People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972), cert.
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1973) (No. 72-857).
2. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11530.5, 11531 (West 1964) (currently codified at Cal.
Health & Safety Code §§ 11359, 11360 (West Supp. 1972).
3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (evidence seized by state officials by
way of an illegal search held inadmissible).
4. 7 Cal. 3d at 902-03, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The court also noted, preliminarily, that: (a) an airline has legal authority to "open and inspect [a] package if It
suspects that the nature or value of the contents does not correspond" to the consignor's
representations. Id. at 913, 500 P.2d at 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr. 907; and (b) the air freight
agent was not acting as an agent of the police when he originally searched the carton. Id.
at 916, 500 P.2d at 1109, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
5. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
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is a subject which has in recent years been fraught with great difficulty and
uncertainty.6 One principal has, however, been established. As the Supreme
Court declared in 1967,
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions
Among the exceptions is that which the Court carved out in the 1925 case of
Carrollv. United States.8 Since it was upon Carroll, and its more recent progeny,
that the California Supreme Court relied in allowing the warrantless search in
McKinnon, it is to this line of cases that we turn first.
Carroll and his co-defendant Kiro were stopped and their automobile searched
by federal agents, who suspected the two of dealing in illegal "bootleg" whiskey.
The search turned up 68 bottles of whiskey, and the defendants were subsequently found guilty of having violated the National Prohibition Act 0 The
defendants attacked their convictions on the ground that the whiskey had been
discovered in the course of an unlawful search' 0 and therefore should not have
been admitted into evidence."'
The Court found that Congress, in enacting the Prohibition Act, had intended
to distinguish between searches of "private dwellings" and searches of "automobiles and other road vehicles."'1 2 In examining the warrantless search before it,
to be seized." U.S. Const. amend IV. Although by its terms the amendment is not applicable
to the states, it was "incorporated" into the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment by Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as a result of which all searches and seizures
are now tested by the same standard.
6. See, e.g., LaFave, Warrantless Searches & the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into
the "Quagmire," 8 Crim. L. Bull. 9 (1972). Of course, the necessity of the search and sceizure
prohibition itself has never seriously been questioned. As was stated by Ar. Justice Jackson
in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949): "Uncontrolled,
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and
possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police." Id. at
180-81 (dissenting opinion).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). There are five
basic categories of these exceptions: see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)
(seizure of contraband or evidence in "plain view" while police are lawfully on the premises) ;
Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (search conducted while police in "hot
pursuit" of a suspected felon) ; Schmerber v. California, 384 US. 757, 770-71 (1966) (emergency situation where evidence in danger of being destroyed) ; Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925) (search of an automobile with probable cause); and Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (search incident to lawful arrest).
8. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
9. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 305, 307 (1919) (repealed 1935).
10. 267 U.S. at 134.
11. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
12. In 1921, Congress passed legislation supplementing the National Prohibition Act. Act
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the Supreme Court in Carroll was faced with the question whether this was a
constitutionally permissible distinction. The Court concluded that it was. It
declared:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.15
The Court did not mean of course that all safeguards were to be dispensed with
in vehicular searches-only the safeguard of a warrant. "Probable cause" remained a prerequisite even for a Carroll search.' 4
Most early applications of the Carrollexception arose out of searches related
to violations of the National Prohibition Act, and of federal revenue laws dealing
with illegal alcohol. 15 These decisions added few refinements to the basic rule.
Commencing in the middle 1960's, however, a series of cases put specific limitations on the Carrolldoctrine.
Preston v. United States'6 was the first of these. In Preston, defendants were
arrested for vagrancy and their car towed to a police garage. After the defendants had been jailed, the police searched the car without a warrant and found
evidence of a planned bank robbery. The defense took the position that the
search had been unlawful and that this evidence should have been suppressed.1 7
Citing Carroll, the Court stated:
of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 305, 307 (repealed 1935). As initially proposed, and
adopted by the Senate, section 6 of the Supplemental Act made it a misdemeanor for a
federal agent in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act to "search or attempt to
search the property or premises of any person without previously securing a search warrant
...." 61 Cong. Rec. 4737 (1921). The House Judiciary Committee objected to the wording
of the Senate version on the grounds that it would "make it impossible to stop the rum
running automobiles .. .[since blefore a warrant could be secured the automobile would
be beyond the reach of the officer . .. ." H.R. Rep. No. 344, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1921).
As a result of this objection, a compromise was reached, in which section 6 punished only
warrantless searches of "private dwelling[s]" and searches of "other building[s] or property"
without a warrant, done "maliciously and without reasonable cause." Act of Nov. 23, 1921,
ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 223 (repealed 1935). Discussing these events, the Court in Carroll
concluded: "The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for a search
warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road
vehicles is [sic] the enforcement of the Prohibition Act is thus clearly established by the
legislative history ... ." 267 U.S. at 147.
13. 267 U.S. at 153.
14. Id. at 156. The Court stated that before a warrantless search could be made, It was
necessary that an officer have "reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile
which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein . . . ." Id.
15. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949); Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251, 252 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931).
16. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
17. See id. at 366.
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[Q]uestions involving searches of motorcars.., cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this reason, what may
be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar....
But even in the case of motorcars, the test still is, was the search unreasonable.' 8

The Court found that under the facts before it the warrantless search had been
"unreasonable" since at the time it was conducted the defendants were already
in jail-and their auto, by virtue of that fact, immobile. 19 Preston thus seemed
vehicular searches only so long as
to limit the Carroll rule to allow 2warrantless
0
an emergency situation obtained.
The next major case in this area was Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing
Co.2 1 There defendants were arrested for reckless driving as they sped away
from the scene of a shooting which occurred during a labor dispute. After defendants were in jail, the police searched their car and found an air rifle, which was
used as evidence to obtain their convictions.e
In Dyke, as in Preston, there was no exigent circumstance to justify the
failure of the police to obtain a warrant. However, rather than reaffirm Preston
the Court held that the search was illegal because the police lacked probable
cause to believe they would find evidence of a crime.3
It was against this precedential background that the Supreme Court of
California in 1969 considered the constitutional issues involved in searching a
chattel consigned to a common carrier. In People v. McGrew24 the suspicions of
an air freight agent led police to a footlocker which had been left in the agent's
custody, and another left in the custody of a second agent. Marijuana was
found in both. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court observed that
"[t]he exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant ...are [available]

where there is a danger of 'imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of
the property intended to be seized' ... ,"25 The court held that since there was
no reason to believe that the lockers would be removed or destroyed, no justification existed for the warrantless searches before it.2
A year after the McGrew case, the United States Supreme Court decided
Chambers v. Maroney.- 7 In Chambers the Court was faced with the same issue
it had chosen to avoid in Dyke; however, the Dyke escape route was closed to
it since the presence of probable cause could not be denied. The four defendants
18. Id. at 366-67 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 368.
20. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 n.2 (1965). But see Chambems v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
21. 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
22. Id. at 218-19.

23. Id. at 222.
24. 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 909 (1970),
overruled, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
25. 1 Cal. 3d at 409, 462 P.2d at 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 410, 462 P.2d at 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476. See also the companion case Abt v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P.2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969), rev'd, 7 Cal. 3d 899,
500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
27. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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were linked to a gas station robbery through witnesses' descriptions of the persons and car involved. After they had been jailed, the police drove their car to
the stationhouse where, in the course of a thorough search, certain items of incriminating evidence were discovered. 28 Convictions in which this evidence figured prominently were affirmed by the Court. Justice White, speaking for the
majority, reasoned that since the car might properly have been searched on the
highway-a "fleeting target for a search"-it was not improper that it be
searched later, in the stationhouse, without a warrant: the "mobility" of the
car having endured. 29 The Court reasoned that, in terms of "practical consequences," a warrantless search is indistinguishable from its alternative, seizure
of the vehicle, until a warrant is obtained. "For constitutional purposes," the
Court said, "we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding
a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other
hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant."2 0
The Chambers decision received widespread criticism as an undue extension of
the Carroll doctrine. 2 ' The Court had, it seemed, in essence eliminated the warrant requirement from automobile searches.3 2 Justice Harlan, dissenting, began
his discussion of the Carroll rule by stating that:
Fidelity to this established principle [the requirement of a warrant] requires that,
where exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations,
those exceptions be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented. 33
Once the auto in Chambers had been removed to the police station, Harlan
argued, there was no longer any "exigency," and allowance of the warrantless
search had indeed been an undue extension of the Carroll exception. To the
majority's argument, that searching a vehicle is no more constitutionally objectionable than immobilizing it without a warrant, Harlan replied that the latter
Id. at 43-45.
29. 399 U.S. at 52. This argument, however, is difficult to accept in light of the Court's
own pronouncement as to the rationale of the Carroll rule, i.e., that "[ojnly in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Id. at 51.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Professor Landynski wrote that "the automobile search is not subject to the same
rigid constitutional standards as the house search, because the car's mobility makes swift
police action imperative. That a relaxed standard should be applied to search of moving
vehicles, or even of stationary vehicles which can be moved at any time, is thus understandable; that the less strict standard should also be applied to search of vehicles which cannot
be moved, because they are in police custody, is not. Yet the Court's recent decisions have
led precisely to this result. Now, more than ever before, the individual's citizenship becomes
second-class, in so far as his right to privacy is concerned, whenever he steps into an automobile." Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The
Warrantless Search, 45 Conn. B.J. 2, 30-31 (1971).
32. See, e.g., 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1011, 1030 (1971); 47 Notre Dame Law. 668 (1972); 46
Notre Dame Law. 610 (1971).
33. 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
28.
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course was that, precisely, which had been recommended by the Court in
Preston.3
Beyond its inconsistency with the spirit of Carroll, the Chambers decision
seemed out of step with contemporaneous rulings where other exceptions to the
warrant requirement had been restricted .3 It was not long, in any event,
before the Court was presented with the opportunity to reexamine Chambers.
That opportunity arose in 1971 in the case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire.O
Coolidge was a murder suspect against whom arrest and search warrants had
been issued by the state's attorney-general, acting as a justice of the peace. After
he had been taken into custody, the police impounded his car pursuant to the
search warrant.3 7 The car was searched two days later, and twice more a year
later. During the course of these examinations certain particles of gunpowder
were found which were used as evidence to obtain a conviction. 38 The defendant
argued that the search warrant was invalid since it had not been issued by a
34. Id. at 65. "The Court now discards the approach taken in Preston, and creates a
special rule for automobile searches that is seriously at odds with generally applied
Fourth Amendment principles." Id. (italics omitted). The reasoning of the Court in
Chambers seems also at odds with that adopted by the Court in United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 US. 249 (1970). In that case defendant deposited two packages at a
post office to be shipped as first class mail. (Under the rules of permissible searches and
seizures, first class mail is equated to a dwelling in the sense that it is subject to inspection
only under a valid search warrant. Id. at 251.) The postal agent notified the police that he
was suspicious of the packages, and the police detained them for 29 hours while a warrant
was procured. In declaring the acts of the police reasonable, the Court stated: 'Detention
for this limited time was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages enter the
mails and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying to locate them en route
and enlisting the help of distant federal officials in serving the warrant." Id. at 253. See
LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire," 8 Crim. L. Bull. 9, 19 (1972).
35. Another well delineated exception to the warrant requirement is that of a search
incident to a lawful arrest. In 1950, in Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the
Supreme Court sustained the warrantless search of the defendant's entire hore on the
grounds that it was incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 66. See also Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; contra, Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
The law in this area remained fixed for over two decades, until the Court, in Chimel v.
California 395 U.S. 752 (1969), overruled Rabinowitz stating that this exception to the
warrant requirement was limited to "a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within
his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 763.
As one commentator has put it: "On the one hand, the allowable extent of search incidental to arrest has been considerably narrowed by Chimel v. California; on the other, the
authority of the police to search an automobile has been greatly expanded by Chambers v.
Maroney." Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The
Warrantless Search, 45 Conn. BJ. 2, 39 (1971).
36.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).

37.
38.

Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
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neutral magistrate. 39 Conceding the truth of this claim, 40 the Court proceeded
to look at every exception to the search warrant requirement to discern what
grounds, if any, would sustain the searches independent of a warrant. The
Court concluded that the facts before it could be fitted into none of the excepting categories and that the evidence challenged had been improperly admitted.4
Justice Stewart was joined in his analysis of the various warrant exceptions
by only three other members of the Court. 42 However, a majority of the Court
was able to agree at least on the principle that "exigent circumstances," rendering
it inopportune for authorities to obtain a warrant, are required before a warrantless vehicular search may be made.4 To argue that warrantless vehicular searches
are per se reasonable, given probable cause alone, a majority said, would be to
"read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution.1 44 Thus with respect to
the particular facts in Coolidge,
[s]ince the police knew of the presence of the automobile and planned all along to
seize it, there was no 'exigent circumstance' to justify their failure to obtain a warrant. The application of the basic rule of Fourth Amendment law therefore requires
that the fruits of the warrantless seizure be suppressed. 45
Certainly, by its language 40 and by what the Court did in Coolidge, i.e., excluded
39. The attorney general was acting pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 595:1 (1955)
(repealed 1969), when he signed the search warrant; but in addition, he had also "personally
taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief
prosecutor at the trial." 403 U.S. at 447.
40. 403 U.S. at 449-50.
41. Id. at 472-73.
42. justice Stewart's opinion was divided into three parts, only one of which, Part II,
is pertinent to the McKinnon case. This part was itself divided into four sections, the first
three of which discussed the various exceptions to the warrant requirement as they applied
to the Coolidge facts, concluding that none was applicable. However, these parts of te
opinion (fl-A, H-B, and Il-C) were signed by only four members of the Court (Justice
Stewart with Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall concurring). The last of the
sections in part II (II-D) involved a lengthy discussion of Justice White's dissenting opinion,
and reaffirmed that the overriding limitation on all of the warrant exceptions is the presence
of an emergency situation. That part of the opinion was also joined by Justice Harlan.
It is the only part of Stewart's opinion dealing with the warrant exceptions which was
agreed to by a majority of the Court. It was on the basis of this majority that the
evidence upon which Coolidge had been convicted was rendered inadmissible.
43. 403 U.S. at 481.
44. Id. at 480.
45. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
46. Speaking for a plurality of the Court, Justice Stewart stated: "The word 'automobile'
is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. And
surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll
v. United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open
highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates
waiting to move the evidence ....
In short, by no possible stretch of the legal imagination
can this be made into a case where 'it is not practicable to secure a warrant ....
" 403 U.S.

at 461-62 (italics omitted).
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the evidence, the view that via Chambers the warrant requirement had been
eliminated from vehicular searches was soundly rebutted. Lest it appear that
Chambers had in fact been repudiated, Justice Stewart,
speaking for a plurality
47
of the Court, noted that the case did not apply.
The California Supreme Court, in People v. McKinnon, felt that the reasoning
of the Carroll line of cases was apt. It declared:
[G]oods or chattels consigned to a common carrier for shipment . . . are no less
movable than an automobile, [and] the reasons for the rule permitting a warrantless
search of a vehicle upon probable cause are equally applicable to the search of such
48
a chattel.
Once the police had probable cause to believe that the cartons consigned by
McKinnon held contraband, the court said, two alternatives presented themselves. Either the cartons could have been searched without a warrant (as they
were), or they could have been seized and a warrant obtained in the meanwhile.' 0
"Chambers teaches us," said the court, "an immediate search without a warrant
..is no greater intrusion on the rights of the owner than immobilization of the
chattel until a warrant is obtained .... ,,50
The court's reasoning in McKinnon was founded on two premises: first, that
the Carroll"family tree" ended with Chambers and did not extend to Coolidge;51
and second, that the Carroll line of cases is not limited merely to searches of
automobiles, but extends to "things readily moved. 1 2 Putting these premises
together, the court concluded that since the consigned cartons were readily
movable, the police search was permissible under the 5Carroll-Chambers
rule
3
despite the fact that it was conducted without a warrant.
The latter proposition is arguably true. That is, there is language in Carrol-l
5
and in PrestonP
which lends support to an extension of the Carroll exception
beyond automobile searches. However, this appears to be mere dictum: in fact,
the Carroll line has never been applied other than to an automobile search.50
47. "Chambers . . .is of no help to the State, since that case held only that, where
the police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also seize it and
search it later at the police station." 403 US. at 463 (italics omitted) (footnote omitted).
48. 7 Cal. 3d at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (footnote omitted).
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. But see text accompanying note 61 infra.
52. 7 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 500 P.2d at 1103-04, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04 (emphasis
omitted).
53. Id. at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
54. "Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment we find ...
a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of
transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of
reach of a search warrant." 267 US. at 151.
55. "EQluestions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot
be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses."
376 U.S. at 366.
56. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
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Language to the contrary appears in Coolidge,6 7 but that part of the Coolidge
decision carries the approval of only four justices. Since the Supreme Court has
never defined the limits of the Carroll exception, it seems that indeed the California Supreme Court was free to accept the applicability of that exception to
"things movable" other than automobiles. Having done so, however, the court
was constrained to accept all the ramifications of the basic Carroll nile; among
them that an emergency situation must exist for a warrantless search. Recognizing this, the California Supreme Court turned its attention to the exigencies
present in McKinnon.
At this point the court was faced with the precedents it had established in
McGrew and At v. Superior Court,58 wherein on substantially the same facts
it had found in essence that there was no emergency. Nonetheless, in McKinnon
the court concluded that "in the light of supervening developments in the law
[i.e., Chambers] ... the rule of those decisions [McGrew and Abt] is no longer
to be followed .

.

.""

The court went on to say that it was

not unmindful of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire ...properly considered, however, we do not interpret that decision to affect the impact of Carroll and Chambers on McGrew and Abt. 00
Here, it is submitted, the court erred.
Coolidge was a definite descendant of the Carroll line of cases. This fact
should be evident from the analysis set forth above. Coolidge was not only an
automobile search case, it was one in which a majority of the Supreme Court
determined that the exigencies of the situation did not merit a warrantless
search.61
It seems, however, that the Coolidge case had somehow to be disposed of
before the court could reach the conclusion that it did in McKinnon. Aside from
Justice Stewart's language about the Carroll rationale not being applicable beyond automobile searches in the first place,0 2 it is simply easier to draw an
42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), see 403 U.S.
at 461 n.18.
57. "[A] good number of the containers that the police might discover on a person's
property and want to search are equally movable, e.g., trunks, suitcases, boxes, briefcases,
and bags. How are such objects to be distinguished from an unoccupied automobile--not
then being used for any illegal purpose-sitting on the owner's property .... [I1f Carroll
v. United States . . .permits a warrantless search of an unoccupied vehide, on private
property and beyond the scope of a valid search incident to an arrest, then it would permit
as well a warrantless search of a suitcase or a box. We have found no case that suggests
such an extension of Carroll." 403 U.S. at 461 n.18 (italics omitted).
58. 1 Cal. 3d 418, 462 P.2d 10, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1969), overruled, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500
P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); see text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
59. 7 Cal. 3d at 902, 500 P.2d at 1099, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
60. Id. at 910, 500 P.2d at 1104-05, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
61. See note 42 supra.
62. See note 57 supra.

1973]

CASE NOTES

1043

analogy between the McKinnon facts and those in Coolidge than it is between
the former and those in Chambers.
In Chambers, the Court sustained a warrantless search on the ground that an
emergency situation was present; the auto having been stopped on the open
highway, opportunity for search was "fleeting."G3 In Coolidge, on the other
hand, the search was not allowed, the Court concluding that a car parked in
an arrestee's driveway could hardly create sufficiently exigent circumstances."
In McKinnon, the contraband was as stationary and immobile as was the car
in Coolidge's driveway. It could hardly be said that the cartons were in a position "where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant.", 5
The two defendants in McKinnon were in police custody at the time of the
search, and the containers to be searched were in the hands of a common carrier
who had alerted the police, (giving rise to their "probable cause") and who
had proved most cooperative. Moreover, as the McKinnon court itself concedes,
"a common carrier, no less than any other citizen, has the right, indeed the
duty, not to knowingly allow its property to be used for criminal purposes."00
It was highly unlikely, therefore, that the airline, once it had become aware
that the consigned cartons contained contraband, would dispatch them. G7 The
opportunity for police to make a search was thus hardly "fleeting," and the
Carroll line of cases consequently inapplicable.
In deciding McKinnon the court might, perhaps, have paid closer heed to a
1970 decision of the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Van
Leeuwen.0 s In that case the Court considered the question whether it is proper
to delay in transit not air freight, but first class air mail. The Court decided
that a 29-hour delay of first class air mail was reasonable 0 O In light of this,
is it not at least arguable that of the two, air mail and air freight, delay of
the former is more serious; and that therefore it would be if anything as reasonable to delay air freight during the time required to procure a warrant?
In adopting any exception to the fundamental protections of the fourth
amendment, there ought to be recalled the admonition of Mr. Justice Bradley in
Boyd v. United States7 ° wherein he wrote:
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
63. 399 US. at 52; see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
64. 403 US. at 478; see text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
65. 267 US. at 151.
66. 7 Cal. 3d at 914, 500 P.2d at 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (footnote omitted).
67. As the court pointed out: "Although such freight may not present a physical hazard
to other goods or the vehide carrying them, the carrier is not required to risk the injury
to its reputation and business which could well ensue from public knowledge that it permits
its facilities to be used by criminals for the purpose of trafficking in narcotics." 7 Cal.
3d. at 914, 500 P.2d at 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
68. 397 US. 249 (1970) ; see note 34 supra.
69. Id. at 253; see note 34 supra.
70. 116 US. 616 (1886).
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person and property should be liberally construed. . . .It is the duty of the courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
7
encroachments thereon. '

Constitutional Law--Search and Seizure-Production of Voice and Hand-

writing Exemplars to Grand Jury May Be Compelled Without Preliminary
Showing.-Respondent Dionisio was summoned by subpoena before a federal
grand jury and requested to submit voice exemplars, for comparison with
certain recorded conversations obtained by court-ordered "wiretap"' and
received previously into evidence. 2 Respondent declined, asserting that such
disclosures would violate his rights under the fourths and fifth 4 amendments.
The district court rejected these constitutional arguments and ordered the
respondent to comply with the jury's request. When he persisted in his refusal
he was adjudged in civil contempt and ordered into custody. On appeal the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that respondent's fifth
amendment claim was without merit, 5 but reversed, concluding that compulsion
of the voice exemplars would violate his right to be free of "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 6 Subsequently, respondent Mara was adjudged in civil
contempt for his refusal, on fourth amendment grounds, to furnish a grand
jury in the same judicial district with handwriting exemplars.7 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again reversed, relying upon its decision in
the Dionisio case.8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
71. Id. at 635.
1. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973). As the Court noted: "The court orders
were issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518, a statute authorizing the interception of wire
communications upon [certain] judicial determination[s] .

. . ."

Id. at 766 n.1.

2. The jury had been convened to investigate, according to the Court, "possible violations
of federal criminal statutes relating to gambling." 93 S.Ct. at 764; see 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(1970).
3. The fourth amendment provides, in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .

. . ."

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

4. The fifth amendment provides, in part, that: "No person shall ...be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V.

5. Dionisio v. United States, 442 F.2d 276, 278 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 93 S.Ct. 764
(1973).
6. Id. at 279-80.
7. In Mara, the grand jury was investigating possible violations of the conspiracy provision
of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), and of the provision proscribing thefts of
interstate shipments, 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970). Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580, 582 (7th
Cir. 1971), rev'd, 93 S.Ct. 774 (1973).
8. Id. at 582. The court stated summarily: "Under our opinion in In re Dionislo .
it is plain that compelling petitioner to furnish exemplars of his handwriting and printing
is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment unless the Government has complied with its reasonableness requirement .

. . ."

Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
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review both decisions,9 and reversed both. 10 The Court held that while the
Seventh Circuit had been correct in answering the fifth amendment question,
it had erred in deciding that a fourth amendment objection could be raised
against a request for either voice or handwriting exemplars. Such exemplars,
the Court said, evidence "physical characteristics" which are "constantly exposed to the public"" and as to which, therefore, no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists. There is no justification for requiring that any showing be
made before production of them may be compelled. 12 United States v. Dionisio,
93 S.Ct. 764 (1973); United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973).
The right of the government to obtain evidence based on bodily intrusion
was not considered by the Supreme Court in a fourth amendment contexts
until 1966. In that year the Court decided Schmerber v. California,'14 and it
made the observation:
Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with state
interferences with property relationships
or private papers--"houses, papers, and
15
effects"--we write on a dean slate.
In Schmerber, petitioner objected 6 to the admission of blood sample evidence
taken from him following an auto accident in which he had been involved. An
investigating officer had ordered the sample taken despite petitioner's refusal,
on advice of counsel, to consent. 17 The Court ruled that this procedure "plainly
involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment,"' 8 but ruled as well that it had been "an appropriate incident to
petitioner's arrest," and that "the test9 chosen to measure petitioner's bloodalcohol level was a reasonable one."'
9. 406 U.S. 956 (1972) (cases to be argued in tandem).
10. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773 (1973); United States v. Mara, 93 S.
Ct. 774, 776 (1973).
11. 93 S. Ct. at 771.
12. Id. at 772; 93 S. Ct. at 776.
13. In Holt v. United States, 218 US. 245 (1910), Justice Holmes, writing for the
majority, termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment" the argument that
requiring the defendant to don a certain blouse for identification purposes violated her privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 252. The due process clause had also been relied on as
a ground for objection to alleged bodily intrusions. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 US.
165 (1952) (forcible stomach pumping by narcotics agents to obtain evidence held violative
of due process guarantee); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 US. 432 (1957) (no due process
violation in taking blood sample from unconscious party to multi-car accident for purposes
of measuring blood-alcohol content).
14. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
15. Id. at 767-68.
16. Aside from his fourth amendment argument, the petitioner in Schmerber also made
clim based on the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 760-65,
see note 45 infra, on the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel, 384 US. at 765-66, and
on the fourteenth amendment's requirement of due process of law, id. at 759-60.
17. 384 US. at 766.
18. Id. at 767.
19. Id. at 771.
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In the wake of the Schmerber decision, other interferences with the "person"
were brought to the Court's attention in Terry v. Ohio2° and Davis v. Mississippi.21 In Terry, a "stop and frisk" case, the Court ruled in 1968 that this
sort of police-citizen encounter came, indeed, within the scope of the fourth
amendment's guarantee. 22 Although it concluded that on the facts2 3 the intrusion had been a reasonable one, the Court noted that "it is nothing less than
sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt
to find weapons is not a 'search.' "24
In Davis, a 1969 case, defendant was convicted of a rape, the victim of which
had been able to identify her assailant only as a "Negro youth. '2r The police
brought the defendant to the stationhouse, together with at least 23 other
youths, where all were questioned, fingerprinted and released. The former was
indicted and tried after his fingerprints were found to match prints left at the
scene of the crime. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that the
in the course of an unlawful "seizure"
fingerprint evidence had been 2obtained
6
and was therefore inadmissible.

While the Court declined to decide whether, under other circumstances,
fingerprint evidence could be obtained without probable cause and without
violating the fourth amendment's prohibition, 27 it did characterize such evidence
private life and thoughts
as involving "none of the probing into an 2individual's
8
that marks an interrogation or search."

The argument that handwriting exemplars might be within the scope of the
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" appears first to have
been raised in United States v. Long.29 In that case a federal officer obtained
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
22. Having previously held in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," id. at 351, the Court stated in Terry that
"[tihis inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 392
U.S. at 8-9.
23. A plain clothes policeman had observed two men pacing back and forth before a
store window, conferring after each pass. Suspecting the two of "casing a job, a stick-up,"
the officer approached them apprehensively, fearing that they might be armed. When the
two men mumbled something in response to his inquiry, the officer spun the defendant
around and patted down the exterior of his clothing, finding a pistol in defendant's left
breast pocket. 392 U.S. at 6-8.
24. 392 U.S. at 16.
25. 394 U.S. at 722.
26. Id. at 726-28.
27. Id. at 728. The Court noted: "We have no occasion in this case . . . to determine
whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest." Id.
28. Id. at 727.
29. 325 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harris, 453
F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972).
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handwriting exemplars from the defendant while he was incarcerated on a
pending state charge. At the time, the defendant was unaware that federal
charges were being considered and acquiesced in the federal officer's request before any Miranda-type warnings had been given. 30 The Long case was consolidated on appeal with United States v. Harris.31 In Harris, postal inspectors
called on the defendant at his home and informed him that they were investigating the theft and forgery of a welfare check. Defendant was then asked
for samples of his handwriting without first having been advised of his rights. 32
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled as to both cases that the taking of
handwriting exemplars was a "search and seizure" within the terms of the fourth
amendment, stating: "The search is still for evidence of guilt, the evidence
must be obtained from the person of the suspect himself, and it involves some
intrusion into the privacy of the person which the Fourth Amendment is
intended to protect." 33
The decisions in Harris and Long were followed shortly by the decision of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Mara v. United States."4 As heretofore
noted, 35 Mara involved the compelled production of handwriting exemplars to
a grand jury, and relied on the same circuit court's earlier voice exemplar
ruling in Dionisio v. United States.30 In holding handwriting exemplars to
be within the scope of the fourth amendment's prohibition, the court noted in
Mara that "compelling... exemplars of [defendant's] handwriting and printing
is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment37unless the Government has complied
with its reasonableness requirement.1
Soon thereafter, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the
same question in United States v. Doe (Sclrvartz).as In Doe (Sclnwartz)
appellant was summoned by subpoena before a grand jury and requested to
furnish certain samples of her handwriting. 39 She refused, initially invoking
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. However, on reappearance appellant asserted the more advanced position that the fourth
amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches or seizures" imposed
upon the Government a "probable cause" burden which had to be satisfied
before the exemplars could be compelled.4 0 Appellant's contentions were
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 583-84.
453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 1320 (footnote omitted).
454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973).
See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 93 S. CL 764 (1973).
454 F.2d at 582.

38.

457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 406 U.S. 9554 (1972).

39. In a situation factually similar to the Mara and Dionisio cases the government hoped
to compare the writing samples with evidence obtained in a previous investigation into
possible mail and wire frauds. Id. at 896; see notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text.
40. 457 F.2d at 896-97. Appellant's argument, as the court interpreted it, was that "the use
of process to compel the furnishing of handwriting (or voice) exemplars to a grand jury
constitutes a search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment which requires a preliminary
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rejected and she was cited for civil contempt. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that with respect to handwriting (and voice) 42 cxemplars "no reasonable expectation of privacy exists," 43 and that therefore
the compelled production of such exemplars to a grand jury is not a "search"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment and does not require a pre44
liminary showing.
The Supreme Court, in entertaining the Mara and Dionisio appeals, sought
to resolve this split among the circuits.
First, however, the Court dealt with an issue on the resolution of which the
circuits were in agreement: whether protection was afforded in the instant context by the self-incrimination privilege of the fifth amendment. The Court
decided that it was not 4 5-- thereby affirming both the Seventh Circuit's holding
in Dionisio46 and reasoning which had been advanced by the Second Circuit
in Doe (Schwartz) 47
Turning to the fourth amendment issue, the Court noted that the proper focus
showing of probable cause to believe that the witness' handwriting (or voice) resembles
that of a person whom the Government has probable cause to believe has committed a
crime." This at least, the court noted, "is our best understanding of what counsel means
by 'probable cause' in this context; appellant's brief seems to take varying positions on this
point." Id. at 897 & n.1.
41. Id. at 896. The lower court ruling was unreported.
42. Consistently, no attempt has been made to distinguish handwriting from voice exemplars. See, e.g., 93 S. Ct. at 776; 454 F.2d at 582.
43. 457 F.2d at 898.
44. Id. at 899-900.
45. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764, 767-68 (1973); see note 4 supra. In deciding
that no interest protected by the fifth amendment was violated the Court relied on a wellestablished line of cases. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court had
ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available to a defendant from
whom a blood sample had been taken without his consent. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Schmerber laid down an important test of the fifth amendment's
scope, stating that the privilege "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature . . . ." 384 U.S. at 761. Schmerber, in turn, formed the basis for Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), in which the
Court considered, respectively, handwriting and voice exemplars in arrest contexts and concluded in both cases that such evidence was not protected since not of a "testimonial"
character. 388 U.S. at 266-67; 388 U.S. at 222-23. Finally, this same issue was treated in a
grand jury setting, much like that of the instant cases, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Doe (Devlin), 405 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1968). There the court again
rejected the witness' self-incrimination claim, and since no privilege existed, found that refusal to furnish the requested handwriting exemplars justified a moderate sentence for
civil contempt. Id. at 438-39. As was noted by Justice Marshall, respondent Mara did not
make a fifth amendment argument before the Supreme Court, although he had pressed
such an argument at the appellate level. United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 777, 781 (1973)
(dissenting opinion).
46. 442 F.2d at 281.
47. 457 F.2d at 896.
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of attention was that aspect of the amendment which affords protection to
the privacy of "persons." 48 As to the scope of this protection, the Court adopted
a rule identical to that applied by Judge Friendly in Doe (ScIrwartz)4 9:
"'[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy"
...he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions.' ,o
The Court derived its framework for analysis from reasoning it had advanced
in the Schmerber case, wherein it had said that:
the obtaining of physical evidence from a person involves a potential Fourth Amendment violation at two different levels-the "seizure" of the "person" necessary to
bring him into contact with government agents ...and the subsequent search for
and seizure of the evidence. 51
No seizure had occurred in the instant case by virtue of its grand jury
context. This was true, the Court noted, because the compulsion exerted by a
subpoena to appear before a grand jury has not historically been thought to
constitute a "seizure" for fourth amendment 8purposes,
"even though that
52
summons may be inconvenient or burdensome.
Considering the second part of the two-pronged test, the Court queried
whether the taking of voice exemplars would constitute an infringing search.
Relying on the test it had previously formulated, the Court determined that no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to one's voice. 3 Thus, it
concluded that no protected right had been infringed by the grand jury's
requests. 4
Having thus decided that no valid fourth amendment claim had been raised
in Dionisio, either by virtue of the summons to appear before the grand jury,
or by the jury's directive to make a voice recording, the Court further concluded that "there was no justification for requiring the grand jury to satisfy
even the minimal requirement of 'reasonableness' imposed by the Court of
Appeals." 55
The Court's decision as to handwriting exemplars in Mara achieved the same
48. 93 S.Ct. at 768. See also 457 F.2d at 897, where the circuit court stated: 'Decisions
dealing with 'interferences with property relationships or private papers,' thus are marginally
relevant at best." Id. (citation omitted).
49. 457 F.2d at 897.
50. 93 S.Ct. at 769, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
51. 93 S.Ct. at 769.
52. Id. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), where the Court stated: "(I]t
is dearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court or grand
jury in order to testify are public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the
Government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned .

. . ."

Id. at 281. See

also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), where the Court reiterated the "'fundamental maxim that the public .. .has a right to every man's evidence."' Id. at 331, citing
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
53. 93 S.Ct. at 771. The Court noted: "Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear." Id.
54. Id. at 772.
55. Id.
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result. There the Court concluded: "Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly
shown to the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical
characteristics of a person's script than there is in the tone of his voice."5 0O
If nothing else, the Court's decisions in Dionisio and Mara leave the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Harris and Long in grave doubt. While it is
possible that those decisions might be distinguished on the basis of their arrest
as opposed to grand jury contexts, 57 their reliance on the notion that handwriting samples are within an area protected by the fourth amendment makes
even this distinction questionable. Additionally, the appeal on fourth amendment grounds of petitioner Schwartz in the Second Circuit Doe (Schwartz)
case will now surely be rejected and her contempt citation upheld. 8
The Court's determination that handwriting and voice exemplars are not
protected by the "search and seizure" prohibition brings to mind both pragmatic
and philosophical considerations. From a pragmatic view, it is at least conjecturable that had a preliminary showing requirement been imposed, refusal
to consent to the taking of exemplars would have become matter of course.
This true, the government would have been forced, on any occasion it desired
to compel production of exemplars, to prematurely disclose at least enough
of its evidence to make the requisite showing. In effect, this would have
afforded witnesses who were also potential defendants an additional discovery
tool perhaps inconsistent with the intent of Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 59 That rule presents a bar, even on a showing of materiality and reasonableness, to "the discovery or inspection of . . . statements
made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses ....
The role of the grand jury in criminal investigations is certainly the most
vexing problem underlying the issues of the instant cases. In Doe (Schwartz),
Judge Friendly summarized that role as it has traditionally been conceived
when he noted: "The grand jury was regarded by the founders not as an
instrument of oppression but as a safeguard of liberty so important as to be
preserved in the Fifth Amendment.""' Recently, however, the ability of the
grand jury to perform its traditional function has been viewed with some
skepticism. 0 2 Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Dionisio remarked
56.

93 S. Ct. at 776.

57. See 453 F.2d at 1319, where the court stated, apparently erroneously, that: "We
conclude that the taking of the handwriting exemplars in these cases was a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
58. The heavy reliance of the Court on Judge Friendly's opinion in Doe (Schwartz) Is
to be noted. See, e.g., 93 S. Ct. at 769-72.
59. Pragmatic considerations will not, of course, be allowed to stand in the way of clear
constitutional mandates. See, e.g., the "exclusionary rule" enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
60. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. See generally Comment, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases-Rule 16 and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 35 Fordham L. Rev. 315 (1966).
61. United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. The argument is raised consistently in these cases that to permit the grand jury to
compel production of evidence of this nature without a preliminary showing is to allow the
prosecutor to accomplish through the use of the grand jury what he could not do other-
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that "the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen
and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive."63 Those who adhere to
this view, however, were revealed by Dionisio to be a distinct minority of
the Court. Justice Stewart, summing up the majority's viewpoint on this
matter, declared:
The grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protective bulwark standing
solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor, but if it is even to
approach the proper performance of its constitutional mission, it must be free to pursue
its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not
trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it. 4
Just what are these legitimate rights remains open to dispute, but the Court,
it seems, has closed the door on the issue of protection of handwriting and
voice exemplars.

Constitutional Law-State Statutes Authorizing Summary Prejudgment
Replevin Orders Held Violative of Constitutional Due Process Requirements.--Plaintiffs purchased goods under terms of conditional sales contracts.'
Upon default, creditors utilized state replevin procedures to regain possession
of the chattels. 2 Plaintiffs instituted suit claiming that the statutes in question
were violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment insofar
as they failed to provide for notice and a hearing prior to seizure.3 In both
cases, three-judge district courts sustained the statutes 4 and plaintiffs appealed. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
statutes worked a deprivation of procedural due process since they denied
wise. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 899 (2d Cir. 1972). For an
examination of the grand jury and the rights of the grand jury witness and the criminal
defendant, see Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 Geo. L.J. 1 (1972), wherein the author
concludes that reform is urgently needed if the grand jury is to fulfill its traditional role,
and suggests several specific areas that require legislative attention.
63. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S.Ct. 764, 777 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 773.
1. The case is a consolidation of two actions. Margarita Fuentes purchased a gas stove
and stereo. Three other appellants also purchased household goods. The fifth appellant had
been engaged in a dispute with her ex-husband over child custody-the goods in question
were the child's clothing, furniture and toys. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US. 67, 70-72 (1972).
2. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 78.01, .07, .08, .10, .13 (Supp. 1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1821
(1967) ; id. R. Civ. Proc. §§ 1073, 1076, 1077, 1087(a) (1967) ; see 407 US. at 73-78 nn.6, 7,
9.

3. Plaintiffs additionally contended that the replevin provisions authorized searches and
seizures in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 407 U.S. at 71 n2, 92 n.32.
4. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (ED. Pa. 1971) ; Fuentes v. Fairdoth, 317 F. Supp.
954 (SMD. Fla. 1970).
5. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, Epps v. Cortese, 402 US. 994 (1971);
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
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debtors an opportunity to be heard beJore chattels were seized. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

The concept of procedural due process is a revered and ancient one; its roots
have been traced to the eleventh century." Designed to prevent capricious

government deprivation of property,1 due process guarantees "the administration of equal laws according to established rules, not violative of the funda-

mental principles of private right, by a competent tribunal having jurisdiction
of the case and proceeding upon notice and hearing."8 Since the Constitution
does not detail the requirements of due process, 9 its application has not been
confined by a rigid formula. Rather, it has traditionally entailed a "delicate
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those

whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process."10 In its
balancing of interests to determine the elusive requirements of due process,

the Supreme Court has necessarily sought guidance in the common law."
6. R. Mott, Due Process of Law 1 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Mott]. "The basis of
due process, orderly proceedings and an opportunity to defend, must be inherent In every
body of law or custom as soon as it advances beyond the stage of uncontrolled vengeance."
L. McGehee, Due Process of Law Under the Federal Constitution 2 (1906) [hereinafter
cited as McGehee]. The tradition of due process has been traced to the Bible: "God himself
did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence." The
King v. Cambridge Univ., 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704 (K.B. 1723).
7. 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1951 (1891)
[hereinafter cited as Story].
8. McGehee 1 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see id. at 76-77.
9. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).
Historically, the requirements of due process have been equated with the standard of the
"land of the land." McGehee 1, 10, 16, 24; Story §§ 1941-43. Contra, Mott 25. This
definition presented Story with a paradox: If every sovereign act becomes the law of the
land, then a guarantee of due process becomes a fiction, devoid of substance. Story § 1943.
Due process, however, transcends the law of the land; it requires that Justice be administered in accordance with certain fundamental principles to which even the sovereign must
bow. Id. § 1945. The significance of the equation of due process with law of the land,
in the context of the American federal system, lies in the idea that "[wihile the cardinal
principles of [due process] are immutable," the methods of the administration of justice In
compliance with these guiding principles may find as many variations as there are states.
McGehee 38.
10. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; see Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ;
FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
11. The Court has indicated that guidance as to the determination of the requirements
of due process might be found by "look[ing] to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England. . . ." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856) ; see Story § 1947. "The Fourteenth
Amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy history for the States and substitute
mechanical compartments of law all exactly alike. If a thing has been practised for two
hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it . . . ." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922); see Frank v.
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Deeply imbedded in the common law tradition, and apparently invulnerable
to constitutional attack, was the summary remedy of replevin, an ancient procedure dating as far back as the twelfth century.' 2 It has been summarized as
the right of one wrongfully deprived of his property to apply to the sheriff
for its summary return "upon giving good security to try the right of taking
it in a suit at law .

. . ."'

The remedy has withstood the rigorous test of

4
time, and has been codified in most jurisdictions.1
5
In McKay v. McInnes, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Supreme Court of Maine' 6 that summary attachment was not violative of due
process of law.17 The Maine court had held that the remedy was valid since
"it is a part of a process, which during its proceeding gives notice and opportunity for hearing and judgment of some judicial or other authorized
8
tribunal."'
In two more recent decisions, the constitutionality of summary prejudgment
procedures came under the dose scrutiny of the Supreme Court.'0 In the
landmark decision Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,20 the Court determined
that a summary prejudgment garnishment constituted a taking of property
without the procedural due process required by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, in recognizing the necessity of balancing interestsf21 held that
while under some circumstances summary procedures might be justifiable,2
the working man's need to retain the use of his wages--"a specialized type of

Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 370 (1959); McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 114-15, 141 A. 699,
702 (1928), alPd, 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (per curiam).
12. 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 283-44 (3d ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited
as Holdsworthl. "Replevin is among the earliest remedies given by the common law." J.
Cobbey, Law of Replevin § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1900). The remedy first appeared in the lex
scripta in 1267. Id. at 2.
13. W. Blackstone, Commentaries 529 (B. Gavit ed. 1941). An excellent description
of the procedures of common law replevin and the dilatory measures utilized to circumvent its force may be found in Holdsworth 283-85. The scope of its process vas
initially limited to recovery of chattels detained by a landlord in the course of a dispute
with his tenant, id. at 283, but later became greatly enlarged to include all claims against
goods in the possession of another. J. Cobbey, Law of Replevin 30 (2d ed. 1900).
14. J. Cobbey, Law of Replevin 30 (2d ed. 1900).
15. 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (per curiam).
16. Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
17. The Court's brief decision was based on the authority of two prior holdings: Coffin
Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (sustaining the constitutionality of a prejudgment
execution creating a lien on defendant's property); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)
(sustaining the constitutionality of a writ of foreign attachment).
18. 127 Me. at 116, 141 A. at 702-03. Also central to this court's analysis was a strong
presumption of constitutionality in view of the remedy's long, unchallenged history. Id. at
114-15, 141 A. at 702; see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
19. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
22. 395 U.S. at 339. The Court enumerated several cases in which the circumstances were
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23

property" -completely outbalanced the interest of the creditor. Acknowledging the plight of the wage-earner, the Court noted that garnishments
could
"as a practical matter, drive a wage-earning family to the wall." '24
The scope of Sniadach was particularly ambiguous since its language dealt
primarily with situations involving necessities 2 The decision failed, however,
to provide any guidelines to determine the constitutionality of "ordinary"
20
situations such as prejudgment replevin orders.
Goldberg v. Kelly 27 provided no enlightenment. Examining a New York

procedure which permitted the termination of welfare payments without prior
notice or hearing, 28 the Court found that the requirements of due process
were wanting.2 9 "[T] ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy ...
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits. 3 0 Clearly the state's interest in preserving its funds by terminating
such as to warrant a summary procedure: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S.
594 (1950) (promotion of public health by the seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (federal protection of the public against bank failures) ; Coffin
Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (state protection of the public against bank failures);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (protection of creditors through writs of foreign
attachment against non-residents).
23. 395 U.S. at 340.
24. Id. at 341-42 (footnote omitted), citing 114 Cong. Rec. 1833 (1968) (remarks of
Congressman Gonzales). Mr. Justice Black, in a strongly worded dissent, deplored the
Court's "plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative power to decide what the State's
laws shall be." Id. at 345 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
26. For an evaluation of the implications of Sniadach, see Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing
& Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-48 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). Commentators were rife with analyses and speculation. See,
e.g., Comment, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 Albany L. Rev. 426
(1970); Comment, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 942 (1970); 68 Mich.
L. Rev. 986 (1970) ; Note, Forcible Prejudgment Seizures, 25 Sw. L.J. 331 (1971) ; 4 Suffolk
L. Rev. 585 (1970); 1971 U. Ill.
L.F. 336; 24 Vand. L. Rev. 155 (1970); 72 W. Va. L. Rev.
165 (1970).
27. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
28. Plaintiffs had been receiving welfare benefits purguant to N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law
§§ 343-62 (McKinney 1966), as amended, N.Y. Soec. Serv. Law §§ 343-62 (MeKinney Supp.
1972), a federally supported program, and N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law §§ 157-65 (McKinney
1966), as amended, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 157-66 (McKinney Supp. 1972), a program
financed and administered by the state and local governments.
29. The Court determined that the principles of due process require that "a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend . . . by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally."
397 U.S. at 267-68.
30. Id. at 264. The Court, over Justice Black's dissent, wrote of the welfare recipient's
"brutal need" for his benefits. Id. at 261, citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 Yale L.J. 1234 (1967).
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the payments of those who were erroneously or fraudulently on the welfare
rolls was outweighed by the competing interest of the welfare recipient 3 l32
perhaps a foregone conclusion in light of Sniadach.
The issue of the constitutionality of summary prejudgment remedies became
a much litigated matter, with varying results in the lower courts. Many courts,
construing Sniadach as enunciating broad due process principles, struck down
such remedies 3 Other courts, however, seizing upon Sniadach's description of

the property there involved as a "specialized type of property" for which there

34
was a particular need, limited the decision to its facts.

In 300 West 154th St. Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings,-" the New
York Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the extrajudicial remedy
afforded tenants for the abatement of nuisances by the New York City Administrative Code.36 The court held that a landlord was not entitled to a

determination of his liability for repairs before tenants could be asked to make
rent payments to the Department of Buildings. Taking a limited view of

Sniadach, the court held that there would be no denial of due process in that
there were none of the special irreversible economic hardships that the Supreme
37
Court found in Sniadacls and Goldberg.
On the other hand, a three-judge federal court sitting in New York struck
down that state's summary prejudgment replevin remedy a in Laprease v.

Raymours Furniture Co. 39 In addition to its finding that the statute was

violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments as constituting an illegal
search and seizure, 40 the court, relying on Sniadach and Goldberg, found that

the failure to provide for notice and hearing prior to seizure rendered it an
unconstitutional denial of due process.4

31. 397 U.S. at 266; see Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in
Welfare Cases, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 604 (1969).
32. If wage garnishments require prior notice and hearing because of the "distinct
problems" they present, a fortiori welfare payments for which recipients have a "brutal
need" require a similar standard of protection. See notes 23-24, 30 supra and accompanying
text.
33. See cases cited in 407 U.S. at 72 n.5.
34. Id.
35. 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260 N.E2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970).
36. 3 N.Y.C. Adm. Code, ch. 22, §§ 564-15.0 to 564-31.0 (Williams Press 1969).
37. 26 N.Y.2d at 544, 260 N.E.2d at 537, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
38. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7101-11 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972).
A short description of the usual course of proceedings pursuant to these provisions may be
found in Comment, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 Albany L. Rev.
426, 447-48 (1970); Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 Colum. L.
Rev. 886, 888-89 (1971).
39. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
40. Id. at 722.
41. Id. "Lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds creates hardships, it would
seem, equally as severe as the temporary withholding of 1/2 of Sniadach's pay, and measured by Sniadach, the hardships imposed cannot be considered de minimus." Id. at 723.

1056

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 41

It was in the face of this uncertainty that the Supreme Court decided
Fuentes v. Stzevin. 42 In Fuentes, the Court was faced with a determination of

the constitutionality of Florida and Pennsylvania laws authorizing a summary
replevin procedure in which "a private party may obtain a prejudgment writ
of replevin through a summary process of ex parte application." 43 Recognizing
that it is well settled that a party is entitled to notice and hearing prior to a
state-effected deprivation, the Court held that these protections must be
provided at a "'meaningful time.'"44 It is only when an opportunity for a
hearing prior to the seizure is provided, however, that "substantively unfair
and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented.1 40
The Court reasoned that the constitutional right to a prior hearing does not
40
merely ensure that "abstract fair play" will guide government activities.
The concrete embodiment of that right, as enunciated by the Court, mandates
that there be no arbitrary encroachments upon the enjoyment of property
rights. For while an award of damages may to some extent remedy an unjust
deprivation, the individual's right to procedural due process-which would have
47
guarded against that encroachment-will have been irretrievably lost.
The Court noted, however, that in order for the constitutional guarantee
of a prior hearing to attach, the interest involved must be a "'significant
property interest.'",4 Thereafter, the fact that appellants may have been in
Another New York court found tools of trade to be "special property" requiring prior
notice due, inter alia, to "the effect upon the debtor of the deprivation of the use of the
property pending the outcome of the lawsuit." Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc.
2d 206, 209, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d
953 (3d Dep't 1972). In Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Civ. Ct.
1971), the court limited Sniadach to the necessities of life, i.e., those goods used "personally
rather than for a commercial enterprise." Id. at 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
Following Laprease, section 7102 of the New York C.P.L.R. was amended to require that
replevin orders issue only "upon such terms as may be required to conform to the due process of law requirements of the . . . constitution of the United States." N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 7102(d)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1972). The amended provision has been criticized for its
"Olympian generality," as "no criteria are set forth to guide the judge in making this [constitutional] determination." J. McLaughlin, 1972 Supplementary Practice Commentary to
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7102, at 125 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
42. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
43. Id.at 76.
44. Id.at 80, quoting Armstrong v.Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
45. 407 U.S. at 81.
46. Id.at 80-81.
47. Id.at 81-82. The Court indicated that it "'has not ... embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.'" Id. at 82, quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
48. 407 U.S. at 86, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). The Court
paid little attention to the contention that the appellants, who had signed conditional sales
contracts, did not have legal title to the goods, concluding that their interests in the continued
"possession and use" of the chattels was adequate to invoke due process safeguards, "substantial [installment] payments" having been made. Id. at 86-87; see Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). That the deprivation was
a temporary one presented no difficulty for the Court since it had previously determined
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default, and might have no valid defense, would not mitigate the constitutional
requirement. The fact that a "significant property interest" was at stake was
sufficient to invoke the protection of constitutional safeguards.4 0
The Court justified its reliance upon Sniadach by noting that the principles
there enunciated were not to be construed as limited to situations involving
necessities of life.50 Emphasizing that prior Supreme Court due process cases
did not differentiate between types of property involved,0 l the Court concluded
that "fi]t is not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to
make its own critical evaluation of those choices and protect only the ones
that, by its own lights, are 'necessary.' 2
The impact of the holding, however, was softened by the Court's indication3
that in "'extraordinary situations,'" outright seizures might be justifiable.
In such cases, however, competing governmental or public interests must be
quite strong, with a "special need for very prompt action.""L Such interests
include government seizures to collect the internal revenue, 0 to meet war
needs, 56 to protect the public against the possibility of a bank failure,5 T to
protect the public health, 58 and to confer jurisdiction upon state courts. 9
However, the added costs of providing for a hearing prior to replevin seizures
that a temporary, non-final deprivation might nonetheless be a "deprivation" in terms of the
due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 407 US. at 84-85.
49. Id. at 87. "It is enough that the right to continued possession of the goods was open
to some dispute at a hearing since the sellers of the goods had to show, at the least, that
the appellants had defaulted in their payments." Id. at 87 n.17 (emphasis omitted).
50. 407 U.S. at 88-90.
51. Id. at 89. See e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941);
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 US.
190 (1933); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 US. 373 (1908) ; Central Ry. v. Wright, 207
US. 127 (1907); Security Trust Co. v. City of Lexington, 203 US. 323 (1906); Hibben v.
Smith, 191 U.S. 310 (1903); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 US. 255 (1903). But see Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 US. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 US. 337 (1969).
52. 407 U.S. at 90 (footnote omitted). Perhaps uncomfortable at the apparent abdication
of the traditional balancing of interests test of due process (see note 10 supra and accompanying text; Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37
Fordham L. Rev. 604, 607-609 (1969)) the Court qualified this statement, noting that
while the relative weights of each of the competing interests was relevant to a determination of the requirements of due process, in property cases involving an interest not characterizable as "de min-i," some form of notice and hearing is necessary. 407 US. at 90 n.2i
(emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 90-91, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); see note 22
supra and accompanying text; notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text.
54. 407 US. at 91.
55. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
56. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254
US. 554 (1921).
57. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 US.
29 (1928).
58. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 US. 594 (1950) (mislabeled drugs);
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated drugs).
59. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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clearly do not, in the eyes of the Court, outweigh constitutional rights.°0 Indeed,
the Court, noting that the Bill of Rights and the due process guarantee were
designed to protect the citizenry from the possibility that an extreme government concern for speed and efficiency might result in the deprivation of their
rights, 61 concluded that the rights of creditors and the interests of states
in protecting those rights must be subservient to the interests of debtors
in maintaining continued possession of their chattels, at least to the extent
of requiring some form of hearing prior to a seizure of the chattels.02 Thus,
the Court found the challenged replevin statutes were not drawn narrowly
enough to limit their application to those situations
in which the elimination
03
of a prior hearing was constitutionally justifiable.
As to the contention that appellants had waived their constitutional rights
by signing a contract permitting the creditor to retake the goods upon a default
by the debtor,6 the Court indicated that this signified little more than an
intent to do so upon the buyer's default. It did not indicate by what means
the seller could regain possession of the goods,6 5 and could hardly be construed
as a waiver of constitutional rights.66 That the waiver was contained in a
contract of adhesion would similarly have militated against the Court's giving
67
it effect.
The dissent concentrated upon what it deemed the central issue in Fuentes.
The property interest of the creditor is, in many cases, no less than that of
the debtor. 68 Given the flexible nature of the due process requirements, 0 and
60. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22. The Court indicated, however, that "[l]eeway remains to develop
a form of hearing that will minimize unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hearing . .. ." Id. at 97 n.33.
61. Id. at 90-91 n.22, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
62. Id. at 92-93, 96-97.
63. Id. at 93. The Court also noted that the procedure constituted an abdication of a
state's control over its own power. Id.
64. Id. at 94. That due process rights to notice and hearing may be waived, see
D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184-87 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16
(1964).
65. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
66. Id. As to criminal matters, the Court has indicated that "[w]aivers of constitutional
rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted). As to civil matters, there is a similar presumption against waiver. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
In the instant case "[tihe purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales
contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made no showing whatever
that the appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print
now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights. ". . . [A] waiver of constitutional rights
in any context must, at the very least, be clear." 407 U.S. at 95 (emphasis omitted).
67. 407 U.S. at 95.
68. Id. at 102 (Burger, C.J., and White & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
69. Id. at 101-02; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970); note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
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the fact that the Court's decision might result in a diminishing of the availability of credit, or an increase in the cost of securing credit, 70 justice and
the economy would be better served by sustaining the constitutionality of the
71
replevin provisions under consideration.
Additionally, the dissent concluded that section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which permits a secured party to regain possession of goods if
this can be accomplished without a breach of the peace, lends the support of
modem authorities to the ancient replevin remedy. 72
A serious constitutional question left unanswered by Fuentes, however, is
the fate of this Code provision.7" While a private agreement providing for
repossession would be immune from the requirements of due process, if the
law aiding a repossessing creditor falls within the contemporary concept of
"state action," 74 then there would appear to be little doubt that the statute's
failure to require notice and hearing prior to the authorized seizure of the
collateral chattel could not withstand the due process mandate of Fuentes."
Fuentes is likely to upset the delicate equilibrium that has become established
between debtor and creditor over the course of decades; 76 even a short period
70. 407 US. at 103.
71. The likelihood of wrongful deprivation of property pursuant to these statutes is
minimal because it is in the economic self-interest of creditors that transactions proceed
smoothly. Id. at 100-01.
72. Id. at 103; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-503 (McKinney 1964).
73. State action depriving a person of a significant property interest without prior notice
and hearing is violative of due process. 407 U.S. at 96-97. Section 9-503 of the Code appears
to violate this principle.
74. The original concept of state action was rather limited. "The provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any
action of private individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1897); see Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Avins, "State Action" and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17
Mercer L. Rev. 352, 361 (1966). Within the last thirty years, a deluge of activities became
"'state action' because they used, in some way or another, government facilities, assistance,
or officials to help accomplish their purpose." Id. at 363.
75. The argument can be made, however, that this provision does no more than codify
prior common law which permitted the peaceful repossession of chattels. "It is generally
agreed that when the buyer defaults, the seller may retake possession, provided that he can
do so peaceably, and without violence .... " W. Prosser, Torts, § 22, at 119 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnote omitted). Repossession might thus be regarded as involving only private parties.
Several courts have so held recently. Kirksey v. Theilig, 41 U.S.L.W. 2325 (D. Colo. Nov.
30, 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (ND. Cal. 1972); McCormick v.
First Natl Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121
NJ. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Ch. 1972). But see Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972). In practical terms, however, creditors would no longer be secure in the remedy. If the
debtor were to institute suit for conversion, the courts might not uphold the creditor's
statutory or common law defense of peaceful repossession. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US. 1,
17 (1948); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
76. In refusing to strike down a replevin provision, one pre-Fuentes court has indicated
that it "does not feel that the security [available to creditors] . . . should be jeopardized
by a sudden declaration of unconstitutionality of one of the remedies relied upon by sellers
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of notice prior to the preseizure hearing mandated by Fuentes may send many
unscrupulous debtors scurrying for cover with their wrongfully gained chattels.
77
As a result, credit may become difficult for the average person to secure.
A recent appellate division decision 78 underscores the likely detrimental
effect of Fuentes upon the economy. The court in that case correctly found
that Fuentes had eliminated any distinction between different forms of property.
The chattels with which the court dealt were tools to be used in a commercial
and "brutal
enterprise, a far cry indeed from the "specialized type of property"
7
need" which formed the basis of Sniadach and Goldberg. 0
The dissent in Fuentes predicted that the decision "will have little impact"
because the constitutional rights which the majority devoted so much effort
to protect are admittedly capable of being contractually waived; it is likely,
therefore, that in the future, creditors will merely make clear to purchasers that
the form of repossession that they will undertake in the event of the buyer's
default will not entail a prior hearing.80 A noted commentator has indicated,
however, that creditors will find "cold comfort" in contract clauses waiving the
right of prior notice. 8 ' While such clauses may under unusual circumstances
be sustained,82 courts will be unlikely to consider them "voluntary" waivers. 8
The potential impact of Fuentes upon the general economy is overwhelming.
Fuentes has already, in its immediate wake, effected a "decimation of state
statutes providing for summary seizure of a variety of debtor's goods;" 84 it casts
a morbid pall over a broad spectrum of provisional remedies, including the
in security transactions." Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. Macmillan, 116 N.J. Super.
65, 69, 280 A.2d 862, 864 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
77. 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
78. Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d
Dep't 1972).
79. See notes 23, 24, 30 supra and accompanying text.
80. 407 U.S. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
81. J. McLaughlin, 1972 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7102, at
125 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
82. E.g., D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); see note 64 supra and
accompanying text.
83. See notes 66, 67 supra and accompanying text.
84. 41 U.S.L.W. 1071 (1972). Among the decisions striking down various state statutes
are: Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (Texas statute authorizing a landlord
Hen and seizure of tenant's personal property for failure to pay rent) ; Schneider v. Margossian, 41 U.S.L.W. 2189 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 1972) (prejudgment attachment); Gross v. Fox,
349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (distraint procedure); Etheredge v. Bradley, 41 U.S.L.W.
2246 (Alas. Oct. 27, 1972) (prejudgment attachment); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 41
U.S.L.W. 2205 (Iowa Sept. 19, 1972) (replevin); Seattle Credit Bureau v. Hibbltt, 7 Wash.
App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972) (prejudgment attachment). It has also been held that a
state-regulated utility may not terminate its services without adequate notice and hearing.
Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). However, a statute
authorizing summary foreign attachment has been sustained as falling within the "extraordinary situation" exception to Fuentes. Gordon v. Michel, 41 U.S.L.W. 2264 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 24, 1972); see notes 22, 59 supra and accompanying text.
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procedural devices of attachment,85 civil arrest,80 temporary restraining orders,87
85. See note 84 supra. New York law, for example, provides that: "An order of attachment may be granted without notice, before or after service of summons and at any time
prior to judgment." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6211 (McKinney 1963). The broad New York grounds
for attachment, id. § 6201(1)-(7) (McKinney 1963); id. § 6201(7)-(8) (McKinney Supp.
1972), are, therefore suspect. The subdivisions may be classified in descending order of likely
validity.
Section 6201(1) will survive constitutional scrutiny as it deals with foreign attachment.
407 U.S. at 91 n.23 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). In
both cases, the Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). See generally Comment,
Foreign Attachment after Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 342 (1973).
Since § 6201(2), involving attachment of the property of a resident defendant who cannot be personally served despite diligent efforts to do so, also entails "attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction .. . [this provision] will probably be safe from constitutional
infirmity." J. McLaughlin, 1972 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6211,
at 25 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Sections 6201(3)-(6) & (8) (subdivision 8 was previously numbered 7), N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 6201(8) (McKinney Supp. 1972), "are primarily designed to serve the security purpose"
of attachment, and as such must surmount a far greater hurdle. J. McLaughlin, 1972 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6201, at 15 (McKinney Supp. 1972); see
text accompanying note 62 supra.
Sections 6201(3) & (4), inasmuch as they comprise situations in which fraudulent intent
is ascribed to the defendant might validly be upheld as emergency measures. New York
courts have been reluctant, in any event, to use the remedies. Elliot v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 11 Misc. 2d 133, 171 N.Y.S.2d 217 (City Ct. 1957), aff'd, 11 Misc. 2d 136, 179 N.Y.S.2d
127 (1st Dep't 1958).
Sections 6201(5), (6) & (8) are, on their face, invalid as they encompass mundane circumstances, clearly not of the type envisaged by the Court in Fuentes when it noted that
under "extraordinary" circumstances there need be no notice prior to a seizure of property.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
Section 6201(8) which allows attachment without notice where "there is a cause of action
to recover damages for the conversion of personal property, or for fraud or deceit" has,
in fact, been recently struck down as violative of due process. Richman v. Richman, 72
Misc. 2d 803, 339 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
Section 6201(7) permits attachment in an action based on a foreign judgment. While it
might be argued that since the defendant has had his proverbial "day in court," the requirement of notice prior to the seizure might here be obviated, the Supreme Court has made
it abundantly dear that the absence of a valid defense will not mitigate the requirement of
prior notice. 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972); see note 49 supra, and accompanying text. This provision it is submitted will thus not withstand constitutional attack. But see Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285 (1924); Langford v. Tennessee, 41 US.L.W.
2534 (W.). Tenn. Mar. 27, 1973).
Thus, it has been indicated that "the practitioner would be well advised to proceed on
notice to the defendant in all attachment cases unless he is persuaded that the risk that
the defendant will flee the jurisdiction or remove the property is sufficiently severe as to
warrant taking the constitutional gamble which Fuentes creates." J. McLaughin, 1972 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6211, at 25 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
86. "The provisional remedy of arrest in civil actions is designated to insure the court's
control over the defendant's person so that a judgment ultimately rendered, may, where
proper, be enforced by imprisonment of the defendant." H. Wachtel, New York Practice
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temporary receiverships 8s and lis pendens,89 as well as replevin which is "not
technically a 'provisional remedy.' ,, Furthermore, its holding has been generalized beyond commercial matters.91 This vast impending upheaval in the
under the CPLR 200 (3d ed. 1970). Notice is not presently required. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6111
(Mclinney Supp. 1972).
Section 6101(1) which provides that an order of arrest may be granted "where there Is
a cause of action for the conversion of personal property, or for fraud or deceit," Is unconstitutionally over-broad on its face, since if a seizure of property presumptively requires
prior notice, a fortiori would the seizure of the defendant's person; see text accompanying
note 63 supra.
Section 6101(2) which permits arrest under certain circumstances where the defendant
is a non-resident, or is about to flee the jurisdiction, may be valid, reasoning by analogy
to attachments for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. See note 85 supra.
87. "If, on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff shall show that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss or damages will result unless the defendant is restrained before
a hearing can be had, a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6313 (McKinney 1963). This provision will escape constitutional condemnation since its scope almost definitionally comprises "'extraordinary situations'" of the
type excepted by Fuentes from its notice requirement. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
It may be noted that preliminary injunctions may not issue without notice to the defendant,
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6311 (McKinney Supp. 1972), and are thus unaffected by Fuentes
88. A temporary receiver may be appointed by the court "[ulpon motion of a person
having an apparent interest in property which is the subject of an action . . . where there
is danger that the property will be removed from the state, or lost, materially injured or
destroyed." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401(a) (McKinney 1963). There has been some controversy as
to whether there is presently a requirement of notice, D. Kochery, Practice Commentary
to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6401, at 223-24 (McKinney 1963), but the practice has been to give
notice to all parties, H. Wachtell, supra note 86, at 218. Due process is, therefore, satisfied.
See Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25 (1971).
89. Lis pendens (notice of pendency) is a provisional remedy for the plaintiff which provides constructive notice to non-parties of the pendency of an action involving property.
"A person whose conveyance or incumbrance is recorded after the filing of the notice is
bound by all proceedings taken in the action after such filing to the same extent as If he
were a party." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6501 (McKinney 1963). The effective period of a valid notice
of pendency is three years from the time of the filing. Id. § 6513. Insofar as a notice of
pendency may be effective for as long as thirty days prior to the service of a summons upon
the defendant, id. § 6512, it may be in violation of the mandate of Fuentes.
90. H. Wachtell, supra note 86, at 223.
91. It has been held, citing Fuentes, "that the Articles of the Louisiana State Bar Association (Article 15, Section 8), insofar as they allow the suspension of an attorney from
the practice of law because of his conviction of a 'serious crime' without affording him a
prior hearing on the issue are in violation of the due process provisions of the United States
Constitution . . ." Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig, 41 U.S.L.W. 2485 (La. Feb. 19,
1973). In Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972), the convening of a threejudge court was ordered to determine the constitutionality of a provision permitting an ex
parte order requiring a husband to leave his home during the pendency of divorce proceedings. "There is an old saw that a man's house is his castle. If modem times will not permit
him moats and battlements, it still remains, I strongly suspect, that the constitution insists
that he be allowed, except in exceptional circumstances, a few words before the sheriff escorts
him out the door." Id. at 111.

1973]

CASE NOTES

1063

law could surely not have been intended by the Supreme Court, and it is
hoped that a clarification limiting the scope of Fuentes, perhaps by broadening
the class of state interests sufficient to dispense with prior notice, will be
forthcoming.

Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel-Wade-GilbertExclusionary Rules
Held Not to Apply to Pre-Indictment Showup.-When petitioner and a
companion were stopped by police and asked for identification, petitioner produced traveller's checks and a Social Security card in the name of "Willie
Shard." Other papers of "Willie Shard" were found in the possession of his
companion. Petitioner at first explained that the checks were play money, and
later, that he had won them in a crap game. Both men were arrested and
taken to the station where the arresting officers learned that, on the previous
day, one Willie Shard had reported that two men had robbed him. Shard was
brought to the station, and upon entering the room in which the two suspects
were seated, identified them as the robbers. Petitioner had not been told that
he might have counsel at the identification confrontation, and he requested
none. Six weeks later, both men were indicted. A pre-trial motion to suppress
the identification evidence was denied, and at trial Shard identified the defendants as the robbers, and testified about the previous identification as well. Both
defendants were convicted.' The Illinois appellate court2 rejected petitionersa
contention that Shard's testimony had been improperly admitted under United
States v. Wade4 and Gilbert v. California.5 Relying on Illinois precedent, that
court held that Wade and Gilbert did not apply to identification confrontations
conducted before indictment, and affirmed the conviction.7 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sixth amendment
right to counsel did not attach until "the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment" 8 and that therefore the Wade-Gilbert
exclusionary rules did not apply. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
A discussion of a criminal defendant's right to counsel must begin with the
1. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 686 (1972).
2. People v. Kirby, 121 IL.App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970).
3. The conviction of Kirby's companion was reversed because Shard's identification testimony was the product of a concededily unlawful arrest and detention. People v. Bean, 121
Ill. App. 2d 332, 257 N.E.2d 562 (1970). Kirby's arrest, however, was based on probable
cause since in addition to possession of the checks, which he surrendered voluntarily to the
officer, he gave conflicting explanations. People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 327-28, 257
N.E.2d 589, 592 (1970). The lawfulness of Kirby's arrest was not before the Supreme Court.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 n.1 (1972).
4. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; see text accompanying notes 61-82 infra.
5. 388 US. 263 (1967); see text accompanying note 75 infra.
6. People v. Palmer, 41 Ill 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
7. People v. Kirby, 121 I. App. 2d 323, 329, 257 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1970).
8. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 US. 682, 689 (1972).
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landmark decision of Powell v. Alabama.9 That case recognized that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment'0 requires a state to appoint
counsel in a capital case if the defendant is either unable to employ counsel
or incapable of making his own defense." The Court added that counsel must
be afforded not only at trial, but at such time before trial so as to provide
"effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."' 2 A pre-trial opportunity
for investigation and preparation was termed a "critical period of the proceedings,"' 8 for the right to a fair hearing would be hollow without the opportunity
14
for an intelligent defense to be prepared by the "guiding hand of counsel.'
Powell's right to counsel was secured by the due process clause as essential to
a fair hearing, but since Gideon v. Wainwright' made the sixth amendment
guarantee of counsel' 6 applicable to the states,' 7 it is that amendment which
defines the right to counsel both in federal cases directly and in state cases,
through the due process clause. This distinction had importance only on the
type of case in which counsel was guaranteed;' 8 whenever the right existed, it
operated during the pre-trial "critical period," as well as at trial. Having
recognized the right, courts were faced with the task of deciding when the
"critical" time began.
In time, there evolved three distinct classes of cases dealing with the time
of attachment of the right to counsel. The first line of cases, like Powell, viewed
the right to counsel in its traditional role as guardian of a fair trial or an
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. "INjor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Reviewing statutes of the Revolutionary
period which altered the common law, the Court demonstrated that the right to counsel is
essential to a fair hearing, which is in turn a requisite for "due process of law." 287 U.S. at
60-70.
11. Id. at 71. Besides indigency, the Court mentioned illiteracy and feeble-mindedness as
circumstances calling for the appointment of counsel. Id.
12. Id. The state had appointed counsel on the morning of trial. Id. at 56.
13. "[Dluring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings ... that is to say, from
the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the
aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that
period as at the trial itself." Id. at 57.
14. Id. at 69. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940), it was said that denial of
an opportunity for pre-trial consultation would make the appointment of counsel a "sham".
15.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Cost. amend VI.
17. 372 U.S. at 342.
18. The concept of "due process of law" limited the right to counsel in state trials to
capital cases. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). But cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). The sixth amendment,
however, guaranteed counsel to federal defendants in non-capital cases as well. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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effective hearing.1 9 In Hamilton v. Alabama" a due-process right to counsel was
held to exist at arraignment under Alabama procedure. Picking up the word
"critical" from Powell, the Court found this arraignment a "critical stage in
a criminal proceeding" 2' because "[a] vailable defenses may be... irretrievably
lost, if not then and there asserted ....1"2 White v. Maryland23 likewise found
a due-process right to counsel at a "preliminary hearing," which was considered
a "critical stage" because a plea was entered before a magistrate. 2 4 The
"critical stage" test was recently reaffirmed in Coleman v. Alabama,25 which
involved a "preliminary hearing." 26 Despite the fact that Alabama excluded
whatever had occurred at the hearing in absence of counsel from use at trial,
counsel's presence at the hearing was held "essential to protect... against an
erroneous or improper prosecution."28 This stage was therefore "critical" and
counsel guaranteed. 29 It was irrelevant that this hearing had occurred before
indictment.30 The inquiry remained whether counsel's presence was necessary
to preserve the right to a fair trial.
In the second line of cases, the Supreme Court considered the point at which
counsel is guaranteed in connection with the admissibility of confessions. The
argument raised was that the use of incriminating statements at trial would be
violative either of due process of law3 ' or the sixth amendment - if the statement was made after a request for counsel had been denied, or after counsel
should have been appointed. Consequently, the Court had first to determine
when counsel was guaranteed. In Crooker v. Californias the defendant had
been booked, and, after his request for counsel had been denied, confessed
voluntarily. 34 Since the defendant had had some legal education and was aware
of his right to remain silent.t 5 he was capable of protecting his own interests,
and counsel was therefore not required under the rationale of the Powell case.
The prejudice resulting from counsel's absence at the time of confession was,
19. See note 10 supra.
20. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
21.

Id. at 53.

22. Id. at 54.
23. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 60.
25. 399 US. 1 (1970).
26. Unlike the "preliminary hearing" in White, which involved entering a plea before a
magistrate, the purpose of this hearing was solely to see if there was sufficient evidence to
present the case to a grand jury, and to fix bail, if necessary. Id. at 8; see text accompanying
notes 23-24 supra.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. Counsel may expose a fatal weakness in the prosecution's case, lay the basis for
later impeachment, make use of discovery or make effective arguments for bail. Id.
29. Id. at 9-10.
30. See id. at 8. But see id. at 22-23 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
31. E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 US. 315,320 (1959).
32. E.g, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-04 (1964).
33. 357 US. 433 (1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966).
34. So the Court found. 357 US. at 438.
35. Id. at 440.

1066

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

the Court held, not so great as to render its use at trial "fundamentally
unfair."3 6 In Spano v. New York8 7 the defendant raised the same argument,
and attempted to distinguish Crooker on the ground that the return of an
indictment against him had made his right to counsel absolute. 88 The Court
did not hold that the indictment triggered the right to counsel, but held the
confession involuntary, and therefore inadmissible on traditional due process
grounds.3 9 The two concurring opinions, however, would have found a right
to counsel. Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized that at the time of confession
Spano was not merely a suspect, but the "accused" 40 and especially needed
counsel's protection against a "secret inquisition" which might make the trial a
sham. 41 Mr. Justice Stewart similarly thought that the indictment initiated those
criminal proceedings during which "the accused has an absolute right to a
lawyer's help .... ,,42
Massiah v. United States43 was the first case to find that the use at trial of
incriminating statements made in counsel's absence but at a time when his
presence was guaranteed was a violation of the sixth amendment. 44 Citing the
two concurring opinions in Spano, the Court considered the case to be governed by the Powell line of authority, and found that the point at which the
evidence was obtained by electronic eavesdropping was a "critical stage." 40
Massiah was, at this point, free on bail under indictment,4 7 but the Court did
not say that indictment--or any other fact-automatically triggered the
critical stage.
However, Escobedo v. Illinois expressly declared that the fact of indictment or other formal charge was not decisive on the question of the critical
stage. 49 That case held that when the pre-trial process "shifts from investigatory
to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
a confession- .
." 0 the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches,," and
36. Id.; see Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), wherein similar reasoning was applied to a confession made before
arraignment. Mr. Justice Douglas, however, dissented in Crooker on the theory that a guarantee of counsel would be a good "procedural safeguard against coercive police practices." 357
U.S. at 443 (footnote omitted).
37.

360 U.S. 315 (1959).

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 320.
Id.; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
360 U.S. at 325 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 326 (concurring opinion).

42.

Id. at 327 (concurring opinion).

43. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
44. Id. at 206. This was a federal case.
45. Id. at 204-05. It should be noted that, unlike Powell, whatever prejudice counsel's
absence caused Massiah did not go to the matter of preparation and investigation.

46. Id. at 205.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
378
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 201.
U.S. 478 (1964).
at 485-86.
at 492.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), bad incorporated this guarantee into

19731

CASE NOTES

1067

therefore a confession obtained after a denial of counsel during the accusatory
process is inadmissible. 52 The Court felt that even though Escobedo was not
formaly accused, he was, in the eyes of his interrogators, "the accused," and
was therefore under great pressure to confess his guilt.53 Furthermore, since
he could not know the legal implications of his confession, counsel's advice
was at this time critical to him.5 4 Thus, the Court found that the "accusatory"
or "focusing" period, which, for Escobedo, began without formal accusation,
commenced the critical stage. 55
The decision in Miranda v. Arizona,"6 two years later, went further. The

Court ruled that once a suspect is in custody, or "otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way," 5 7 he must be informed of his right to

have counsel present during interrogation and if he desires counsel's presence,
no interrogation consonant with the sixth amendment may occur until counsel

is secured.58 Miranda was a fifth amendment case, 50 but it used the right to
counsel to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination c°
The third line of cases in which the Supreme Court has found a right to
counsel during pre-trial proceedings concern the lineup. In United States v.

Wade,' 1 the defendant attacked his conviction for bank robbery principalyG
on the ground that in-court eyewitness identification should have been excluded.
He claimed that an earlier identification by the same witness had been made
at a post-indictment lineup conducted without notice to defendant's counsel.0a

The governing principle was dear: counsel is assured at any "critical stage
of the proceedings," which was defined to be the point at which "counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial."" The Court
then found identification confrontations 5 to be "riddled with innumerable
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. All cases discussed hereinafter involve
the guarantee as incorporated.
52. 378 US. at 490-91.
53. Id. at 485; cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., con-

curring).
54. 378 U.S. at 486. His admission of complicity in the murder plot was, under Illinois
law, as damaging as a confession of the deed itself. Id.
55. Id. at 490-91. But see id. at 493-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. 384 US. 436 (1966).
57. Id. at 445.
58. Id. at 474.
59. Id. at 477. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), had incorporated this privilege
into the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
60. 384 US. at 466, 477.
61. 388 US. 218 (1967).
62. The Court rejected Wade's claim that participation in the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination, since exhibition for observation is not compulsion to give
evidence of a "testimonial or communicative" nature, which alone is protected. Id. at 221-22,
citing Schmerber v. California, 384 US. 757, 761 (1966).
63. 388 U.S. at 219-20.
64. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
65. These include the lineup, at which several persons are shown to the eyewitness or
victim, and the showup, at which only the one suspected by the police is presented.
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dangers"' 8 to a fair trial, the chief vice being that the "suggestion inherent"
in such confrontations often leads to mistaken identity.0 7 The subtle suggestion
that the authorities believe a particular participant in a lineup to be guilty
may be communicated, intentionally or not, in many ways.08 A witness is
likely to be unaware that what he believes to be his objective judgment has
been affected by the suggestion, or an excited victim may be only too ready to
accept it. 69 In any event, a witness is unlikely to retract an identification once
made. 7° Because of this serious danger, and because the defense can seldom
reconstruct any unfairness at trial,71 the post-indictment lineup was found to be
a "critical stage of the prosecution, 7 2 at which counsel is guaranteed. 7 To
enforce its findings, the Court ruled that the prosecution would be prohibited
from introducing into evidence any in-court identification of a defendant by a
witness who had viewed such an unconstitutional lineup, unless the prosecution
could establish that the in-court identification had a basis independent of such
lineup. 74 In the companion case of Gilbert v. California,75 the Court also
applied the Wade rules to trials in state courts.
Wade restricted its holding to post-indictment confrontations, 70 yet contained language which seemed to encompass any pre-trial identification confrontation.71 As a result, lower courts found diverse approaches and answers to
66. 388 U.S. at 228.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 227-39. Any circumstance which singles one participant out from the others Is
suggestive: a gross dissimilarity in appearance or bearing; making one participant alone wear
clothing or speak words known to have been used by the criminal; or asking the witness If he
"is sure it wasn't Number 3?" The suggestion may be quite unintentional, i.e., an officer may
betray surprise if the witness fails to recognize the one he thought guilty. A showup, by Its
very nature, is even more suggestive. See generally, Williams & Hammelmann, Identification
Parades, Parts I & II, 1963 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 479-90, 545-55; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 487
(1971); Comment, The Right to Counsel During Pretrial Identification Proceedings-An
Examination, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 740 (1968).
69. 388 U.S. at 230.
70. Id. at 229.
71. Id. at 230.
72. Id. at 237.
73. Id. at 236-37. By his presence alone, counsel may help avert suggestive practices, and,
if they occur, he can testify to them. Id. at 238. It is unclear if counsel's role was envisaged

to be more than that of a mere witness. But cf. id. at 256-59 (White, J., dissenting in part).
On counsel's role see generally Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 65 (1967); 77 Yale L.J. 390 (1967).
74. 388 U.S. at 240. The free use of 'independent basis" is a common way for courts to
avoid the impact of Wade. See United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 1970)
(dissenting opinion). On ways of avoiding Wade in general, see Comment, The Rlight to
Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 830 (1969).
75. 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). It also excluded per se evidence of the previous lineup
identification. Id. at 273.
76. 388 U.S. at 236-37.
77. See, e.g., id. at 227, where the Court said: "[Tihe principle of Powell v. Alabama and
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the question of Wade's applicability to formal78 confrontations conducted
prior to the lodging of formal charges.
Most courts which considered the question concluded with little discussion
that Wade was not meant to be restricted to post-indictment confrontations.07
For example, the California Supreme Court in People v. Fowlers argued that
an identification held before indictment is just as "critical" as one held after,
since the fact of indictment in no way affects the dangers which led Wade to
call such a lineup a "critical stage of the proceedings." 8' The court noted that
the protection afforded by Wade could effectively be circumvented if Wade
stage, since all lineups might then be
were limited to the post-indictment
82
conducted prior to indictment.
Despite such reasoning, several other courts considered Wade to apply only
to post-indictment situations.83 One judge, having noted that the lineups in
Wade and Gilbert occurred after the court had appointed counsel, suggested
that Wade limited its holding to post-indictment lineups in view of the practical
difficulties of appointing counsel before indictment, and of the prejudice
resulting to an innocent suspect from delaying the confrontation until counsel
0 4
is secured.
succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation ... "' (emphasis
deleted).
78. The Wade opinion suggested that "countervailing policy considerations" in a give
factual situation might produce a different result. Id. at 237. See generally Comment, Due
Process Considerations in Police Showup Practices, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 377, 385-89 (1969).
Consequently, on-the-scene confrontations occurring moments after the crime have generally
been held exempt from Wade, because the exigent circumstances justify any suggestiveness,
and the short lapse of time makes for correct identification. See, e.g., Russell v. United States,

408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 US. 928 (1969).
79. E.g., Virgin Islands v. Ca]lwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Ayres, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 842 (1970); United States v. Phillips,
427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 867 (1970); Long v. United States, 424 Fad
799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Broadhead, 413 Fad 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), crt.
denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Rivers v. United States, 400 Fad 935 (Sth Cir. 1968); People
v. Fowler, 1 Cal 3d 335, 461 Pad 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969) ; State v. Singleton, 253 La.
18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968) ; Palmer v. State, 5 Aid. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (Ct. Spec. App.
1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); Thompson v.
State, 451 Pad 704 (Nev. 1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.Ead 581 (1968); State
v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d 327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa.
205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723 (RI. 1970); Martinez v. State, 437
S.Wad 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P2d 943 (1969).
80. 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 Pad 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969).
81. Id. at 342, 461 Pad at 649, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
82. Id. at 344,461 Pad at 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
83. E.g., State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 Pad 964 (1969) (en banc); Perkins v. State,
228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969) (per curiar); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d
173 (1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
84.

Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 108-09, 175 N.Wad 625, 633 (1970)

opinion).

(concurring
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Still other courts 85 adopted a third, Escobedo-type approach. These courts
interpreted Wade to apply once the proceedings had reached the "accusatory,"
as distinguished from the "investigatory," stage. 80 It was felt that the danger
of suggestion which Wade sought to obviate would be lessened if the police

did not themselves think the suspect guilty. But when the suspect was in fact
(though not necessarily formally) accused of the crime, the danger of sugges-

87
tion became significant.

The Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois88 has settled the question by holding
that the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rules apply only to identification confrontations held "after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings.180 Following
Wade, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, first noted that the
showup in no way compromised the privilege against self-incrimination because
Kirby was not thereby compelled to give evidence of "testimonial significance. 00
Justice Stewart concluded that this fact meant that Miranda was not in point,
inasmuch as that case was "based exclusively" on protection of that privilege. 01
Miranda had, of course, found a right to counsel during any in custody interrogation. 2
The Court determined that only decisions construing the right to counsel
were relevant and cited a line of such cases stretching back to Powell to support
its conclusion that the "right to counsel attaches only at or after the time
that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated . . . . D This period,
according to the Court, was not limited to trial, but included the "formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."9 4 The
Court recognized that Escobedo was "[tjhe only seeming deviation" 05 from this
85. E.g., United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987
(1968); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Hayes v. State, 46
Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
86. United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948, 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968);
People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 322-23, 175 NAV.2d 860 t 865 (1970); Hayes v. State,
46 Wis. 2d 93, 97, 175 N.W.2d 625, 627 (1970).
87. See generally Comment, The Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the
Lower Courts, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 830, 838-43 (1969). A Miranda-type approach, under
which custody is suggestive enough to trigger the "critical stage," was rejected by one of these
courts. United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948, 951-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987
(1968); cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), which said that a showup, though
widely condemned, is not so unnecessarily suggestive in itself as to violate due proces.
88. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
89. Id. at 690.
90. Id. at 687, quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
91. Id. at 688; see text accompanying notes 59-60 supra. In answer, Mr. Justice Brennan
called this conclusion "erroneous," since Wade had "specifically relied" on Miranda. 406 U.S.
at 692 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
93. 406 U.S. at 688.
94. Id. at 689.
95. Id. But cf. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
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"firmly established" 96 principle, since it had held that the right to counsel
applied before "formal prosecutorial proceedings." But the Court distinguished
that case on the ground that "the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to
vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, ' 7 but to safeguard the
privilege against self-incrimination. 98 For this purpose, Escobedo's "accusatory"
stage was indeed "critical" to the defendant; but, the Court implied, where the
aim is to "vindicate the ...right to counsel as such," the fact of accusation
is irrelevant. 99

The Court justified the line it drew at "the onset of formal prosecutorial
proceedings"'100 by distinguishing between the investigatory and prosecutorial
stages of the pre-trial proceedings.10' Three distinct reasons were suggested
for the validity of the division. First, the Court noted that the "explicit
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment" apply only to "'criminal prosecutions.' 1"0
Why a prosecution within the meaning of the amendment commences only at
formal proceedings was not explained beyond the circular reasoning that the
start of "judicial criminal proceedings" is "the starting point of our whole
system of adversary criminal justice." 0 3 If the sixth amendment demands
that formal proceedings define the commencement of "criminal prosecutions,"
Escobedo is not merely distinguishable because it had a different purpose, but
it is incorrect. This is necessarily so since that case explicitly declared that the
lack of a formal charge "should make no difference" as to the attachment
of the right to counsel.' 04 The Court was silent on another reading of the
constitutional guarantee: that it attaches when one is "the accused," as suggested in several previous right to counsel cases0 6 The Court did not distinguish these precedents on the ground that they were concerned with the
96. 406 U.S. at 688-89.
97. Id. at 689.

98. Id.; cf. Escobedo v. Ilinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). The Court further stated that
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1966), had limited Escobedo to its facts. 406
U.S. at 689.
99. Id. The dissent objected to the implication that the line of right to counsel casesespecially Wade-aimed to "'vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such.' 406 U.S.
at 693 n-3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that Wade, for exanple, aimed at
lessening the hazards to a fair trial which result from mistaken identification. Id. at 69S-98
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 690.
101. "In this case we are asked to import into a routine police investigation an absolute
constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal
prosecutorial proceedings." Id.
102. Id. at 690. But, as the dissent points out, the speedy-trial provision of the same
amendment has been said to attach upon "formal restraint," Le., arrest. Id. at 698-99 n.7,
citing United States v. Marion, 404 US. 307, 325 (1971).
103. 406 US. at 689.
104. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
105. E.g., id.; Spano v. New York, 360 US. 315, 325-26 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966).
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dangers to the privilege against self-incrimination, to which one accused by his
interrogators is particularly vulnerable. Instead, Justice Stewart stated broadly
00
that the sixth amendment is applicable to criminal prosecutions "alone."
01
10 8
Yet, the Court cited with approval' Coleman v. Alabama,' which found a
right to counsel to exist at a preliminary hearing which occurred before any
formal "prosecution."' 109 It may be that the terms "adversary judicial proceedings" and "formal prosecutorial proceedings" were used interchangeably so
as to include the Coleman situation within the "prosecution." Nor did the
Court attach any significance to the words "for his defence" in the sixth
amendment. According to Wade, these words meant that counsel was guaranteed
"whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'defence.' "110
A second reason suggested for an investigation-prosecution distinction was
that the start of "judicial criminal proceedings" sets in motion the complex
machinery of the law, which may bewilder the uncounselled. 111 This consideration would be akin to a "critical stage" inquiry, which took into account the
peril to a fair trial, and the ability of counsel to lessen the peril. 112 Yet Kirby
breaks sharply with prior cases in that it does not inquire into the "criticalness"
of a particular pre-trial stage, but asks merely if the "prosecution" has begun.
In addition, "the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law""13 pose4
a danger to the uncounselled only in the context of judicial confrontations."
Where, however, the counselless encounter is an identification confrontation,
the danger is not the arcana of the law, but a mistaken identification, as
Wade explained at length. 115
Lastly, the Court suggested a wish not to hamper police by imposing a duty
to provide counsel while they are investigating an unsolved crime."10 This
consideration, although eminently valid, need not obtain in every case. 1 7 It
106. 406 U.s. at 690. But Mr. Chief Justice Burger seemed to equate formal accusation
with the start of a "criminal prosecution." Id. at 691 (concurring opinion).
107. Id. at 689 (concurring opinion).
108. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) ; see text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
109. 399 U.S. at 8-10. Both concurring opinions in Coleman, however, were based on the
finding that the hearing, despite the lack of formal prosecution, was nonetheless part of the
"criminal prosecution" of the sixth amendment. Id. at 11-12 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at
14 (Douglas, J., concurring).
110. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
111. "It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal
law." 406 U.S. at 689.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 US. 218, 227 (1967).
113. 406 U.S. at 689.
114. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 20-30 supra.
115. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-33 (1967).
116. "When a person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense, Stovall [v.
Dennol strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of a suspect to be
protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime." 406 U.S. at 691 (emphasis deleted).
117. The police had completed their investigation at the time of Kirby's showup; allowing
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might therefore have been preferable had the Court recognized this possibility
as one of the "countervailing policy considerations" spoken of in Wade,as8
instead of defining "investigation" overbroadly.
The Chief Justice, concurring, agreed that counsel is guaranteed only when
one "becomes the subject of a 'criminal prosecution.' "119 He did not, however,
concede that this necessarily includes every judicial confrontation. He cited his
Coleman dissent, in which he had argued that the preliminary hearing, held
before indictment, was therefore not part of a "criminal prosecution."'-lMr.
Justice Powell gave no reason for his concurrence in the result beyond his
21
disinclination to "extend" Wade.
Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of Wade, writing for three dissenters,l chided the plurality opinion for "'mere formalism.' ,a3 The dissent did not
enter upon an examination of the wording of the sixth amendment; rather,
Wade was thought to compel a contrary result. That decision was shown to have
required counsel at post-indictment lineups not because of the words "criminal
prosecutions," but because of the dangers inherent at identification encounters
to a defendant's right to a fair trial. The "initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings" was considered completely irrelevant to the protection
of this right, according to the dissent, since the identical hazards attend a
pre-indictment confrontation. 124 Also significant in the dissenters' opinion was
the fact that the Court had never adverted to a pre/post-indictment division
in Coleman or similar cases3 28 Although the Coleman confrontation was held
before "formal prosecutorial proceedings," the Court decided the question on
the basis of Wade's non-retroactivity, thereby impliedly admitting its applicability. 26 The dissent seemed to favor a more flexible, "critical stage"
test, which would guarantee counsel at any formal' 2 7 post-arrest identification
confrontation.
The Kirby decision may be less instructive for its holding than for its
approach to defendants' rights in criminal cases. The Court may have felt
that Wade had, in the main, accomplished its work of lessening unfair aspects
for counsel before they contacted Shard would not have interfered with "prompt and purposeful investigation.' The situation is different, however, in an on-the-scene confrontation,
when the police are truly still investigating. Cf. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969).
118. 388 US. 218, 237 (1967).
119. 406 US. at 691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
120. For him, formal accusation seems to commence the "prosecution." Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 23 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
121. 406 US. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
122. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined. MAr. Justice White, a dissenter in Wade dissented separately on the sole ground that Wade and Gilbert "govern this case and compel
reversal." Id. at 705 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 696-97 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
125. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126.
127.

Id. at 701-02 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of identification procedures, 128 and that any unfairness during the pre-indictment stage could better be handled on a case-by-case, due process basis than
by a broad prophylactic rule.129 However, in abandoning without comment the
"critical stage" analysis of forty years' standing in favor of a formalistic
approach to a complex question,130 Kirby seems to indicate a fundamental shift
of emphasis away from an activist Court.

Securities-Merger Partner Not Liable as Matter of Law for Misleading
Statements in Proxy Solicitation of Acquired Company.-Having previously
obtained summary judgment against Gains Guaranty Corp. (Gains), an
acquired corporation, for violations of the federal securities law committed in
the course of a merger with Life Investors, Inc. (Life Investors),' plaintiffs
brought a derivative action 2 seeking summary judgment against Life Investors,
the acquiring corporation, under sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 3 Plaintiffs contended that both the merger agreement
128. Wade was aimed partly at inducing local police to overhaul lineup procedures, sinco
it stated that reforms which eliminate the risk of suggestion might remove a lineup from the
"critical stage." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). In such a reformed jurisdiction, therefore, counsel would not be required. For the Kirby dissenters, this suggestion
was another proof of the irrelevance, for Wade, of indictment. 406 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
129. The Court expressly left open the question whether Kirby's showup was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification as to violate due process. 406 U.S.
at 691 n.8. This is a ground of attack independent of a right to counsel claim. See Foster v.
California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
130. The Court adopted, as to identification confrontations, Mr. Justice Stewart's position
that a "criminal prosecution" commences upon "formal prosecutorial proceedings." In authoring Kirby, however, he did not make clear why, on the wording of the sixth amendment,
the starting point should be different in case of a judicial confrontation, as in Coleman. See
text accompanying notes 25-30 supra. Nor did he account for the irrelevance of formal proceedings in the attachment of the speedy-trial provision (see United States v. Marion, 404
US. 307, 325 (1971)); rather, he seemed to apply the same standard of attachment to all sixth
amendment guarantees. 406 U.S. at 690.
1. Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970), wherein the plaintiffs had successfully argued that the solicitation in question violated section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9(a) and was materially misleading because the proxy
material failed to adequately describe two lawsuits which had been filed in an Iowa state
court as derivative actions on behalf of Gains and its shareholders and further because the
proxy "instructed Gains shareholders that their management recommended approval of the
sale without also informing them that their officers and directors had collectively a very
keen self-interest in securing approval of the sale." Id. at 171.
2. For the basis of plaintiffs' standing, which is not discussed in the noted case, reference
must be made to the prior Beatty case wherein it was stated that plaintiffs were suing both
derivatively on behalf of Gains and as representatives of the class of certain of its shareholders. Id.
3. The court explicitly considered only the plaintiffs' contentions under section 14(a)
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which provided Life Investors with certain rights to approve all actions and
documents relating to the merger, and Life Investors activities under the
agreement, rendered Life Investors equally liable with Gains for misleading
proxy statements. In denying the motion, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa held that neither the agreement nor the
activities established such control over the proxy statement as to make the
acquiring corporation or its officers liable as a matter of law for the misleading
statements contained therein. Beatty v. Bright, 345 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.
Iowa 1972).
When the Securities Exchange Act was adopted in 1934, 4 section 14(a) was
included to assure complete and candid disclosure by those seeking corporate
control through proxy solicitation. 5 Section 14(a) stemmed from a congressional belief that "[f] air corporate sufferage is an important right that should
attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange."0 The section was
intended to promote the free exercise of stockholder voting rights by mandating
that proxies could be solicited only when accompanied by information which
disclosed the true nature of the proposals for which the proxy was sought3
As construed by the Supreme Court, it was the congressional intent to ensure
that "shareholders are able to make an informed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions." 8
In implementing this policy, Congress gave broad powers to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. These powers were inherent in the "public interest" standards of the Act.9 It was determined, moreover, that anyone who
and Rule 14a-9. Concerning the 10(b) claim, it held that: "What has been said above relating to Section 14(a) and the proxy statement applies with equal force to the attempt to
impose liability on the Life Investors defendants under Section 10(b)." 345 F. Supp. at 1193.
4. Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (codified at 15 US..C.
§ 78n(a) (1970)).
5. This purpose was noted in the prior Beatty case (318 F. Supp. at 171), citing Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 795 (8th Cir. 1967). See Orrick, The Revised Proxy
Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 Bus. Law 32 (1956); Von Aehren &
McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 728, 729 (1964).
6. HR. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). For a discussion of this congressional
purpose by the Supreme Court see JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US. 426 (1964).
7. S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 US. 375 (1970), where the Supreme Court held that to permit all liability to be fore-

closed on the basis of a finding that a merger was fair would be to substitute judicial
appraisal of the merger's merits for the informed vote of the stockholders and therefore
frustrate congressional intent. Id. at 381.
8. 396 US. at 385.
9. Section 14 sets forth the "public interest" standard: "It shall be unlawful for any
person... incontravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit
...

any proxy ...

in respect of any security ...

title.' 15 US.C. § 78n(a) (1970).

registered pursuant to section 781 of this
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solicited, or who "permit[ted] the use of his name to solicit any proxy" would
be subject to standards thus established.' 0
Guided by these principles, the courts have employed various tests to effect
the congressional purpose. Once it is established that the language complained
of has a material effect on the outcome of the proxy solicitation," courts have
applied a "solicitation test" in determining a defendant's liability for misleading statements. Active solicitation of the proxy by the offending party, or as a
minimum, some publication or correspondence on his part, coupled with an
intent or continuous purpose to solicit proxy votes, has most frequently been
2
required.'
In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.s3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed a count charging the
defendant with violation of section 14(a) of the Act. It was determined that,
as the complaint failed to aver "that any defendant solicited 'any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security,' "14 a cause of action had
not been stated. 15 Robbins v. Banner Industries, Inc.10 was decided on the same
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Materiality was not at issue. 345 F. Supp. at 1191. It has generally been held that
to show materiality the defect complained of must be of "such a character that it might
have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
deciding how to vote." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). In establishing this very broad test, the Supreme Court had disagreed with the conclusion of the
court of appeals that if a merger would have been approved had the proxy statement not
been misleading, no liability would exist. Therefore, actual causality was not required. Id. at
384-85. Furthermore, neither scienter nor reliance is essential to a finding of materiality of a
misleading proxy statement. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97-98 (]rD.
N.Y. 1969); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For other
cases establishing rules regarding the materiality of a proxy statement see Gould v. American
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 997 n.18 (D. Del. 1971) (omissions or misstatements not individually material might be material in the aggregate); Berman v. Thomson,
312 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D.Ill.
1970) (good faith of directors not to be considered);
Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 709-10 (E.D.Pa. 1965) (information not available at the time of the solicitation cannot be considered); Shvetz v. Industrial Rayon Corp.,
212 F. Supp. 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (materiality not determined by effect on person of
limited education).
12. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), and
Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), employ the "active solicitation" test. Other cases have expanded upon the "active solicitation" test so as to encompass
publication with intent or continuous plan to solicit proxies. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin,
360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); Brown v. Chicago Rock I. & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.
1964); SEC v. Okin, 139 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1943); Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
13. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). The section 14(a)
claim was not the principal issue in this case. The extent to which section 10(b) was applicable to tender offer solicitations was the main question which the court resolved by refusing
to extend section 10(b) protection to the plaintiffs since they bad been neither purchasers nor
sellers of stock. Id. at 965-70.
14. Id. at 970.
15. Id.
16. 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This was a complaint brought derivatively and
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grounds. There a district court dismissed a complaint alleging violations of
section 14(a) on the part of one who was not a director and who was alleged
only to have aided and abetted the acts complained of, without actual solicitation of proxies. 17 The court pointed out that: "There is no allegation that
[the defendant] solicited any proxies ....
We thus cannot regard the complaint as either stating a violation of section 14(a) or adequately apprising
[the defendant] of the acts for which he is being asked to account."' s
In a 1964 SEC Release, the Commission bolstered this "solicitation test"

by stating that:
The application of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and of the proxy
rules is keyed to the concept of "solicitation" of a proxy. If an activity constitutes
solicitation it is subject to the rules, otherwise not.' 9
Some courts have expanded the "active solicitation" test to encompass
activities such as publication of writings and documents preliminary to the
actual proxy issuance, requiring only that there have been an intent to
eventually solicit proxies. For example, in SEC v. Okin, the court found that
a letter written to stockholders by Okin reporting that he had brought an action
to enjoin the wasting of corporate assets, coupled with his intention to continue his plan to solicit proxies, was sufficient to grant equitable relief.2
The court in Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin-2 similarly found liability where
authorization from 42 shareholders to inspect the record of the company's list
of shareholders was held to have been obtained in violation of the proxy rulesY2
representatively by the plaintiff Robbins against the directors of Banner and one Friedman
alleging that the defendant directors issued stock to themselves without fair consideration,
and that Friedman was an aider and abettor. Id. at 760.
17. Id. at 761-62.
18. Id. The court also required that a causal connection exist between the proxy
solicitation and the damage asserted. Id. at 762. This requirement does not represent
the majority view. See AM v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc, 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Union Pac. R.R v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (ND. Ill. 1964).
19. SEC Securities Act Release No. 7208 (Jan. 7, 1964), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 24,107
at 17,619 (1964). "Solicitation" is defined by the Commission as: "(i) Any request for a
proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a form of proxy; (ii) Any request to
execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or (iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy
or other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to
result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." SEC Rule 14a-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1(f) (1972).
20. 139 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1943).
21. Id.
22. 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). As was the case in Iroquois Indus, Inc. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed in note 13 supra, the alleged proxy rules
violation-which the court disposed of with dispatch-was not the principal issue in this
case. Whether the "anti-injunction statute," 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), was applicable to an
action seeking to restrain securities law violations was the court's main problem. 360 F.2d
at 696-97.
23. 360 F.2d at 696. The specific violation complained of was Gittlin's failure to register
his solicitation of the 42 shareholders, which he had obtained for the purpose of qualifying
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There the defendant had announced his intention to solicit proxies for the
corporation's forthcoming annual meeting and the shareholder lists were to
be used in making that solicitation. 24 The court relied on the opinion of the
assistant general counsel of the SEC who reported that "the Commission believes
§ 14(a) should be construed, in all its literal breadth, to include authorizations
to inspect stockholders lists, even in cases where obtaining the authorizations
was not a step in a planned solicitation of proxies."20 Following Judge Hand's
"continuous plan" concept and his warning in Okin that "one need only
spread the misinformation adequately before beginning to solicit, and the
Commission would be powerless to protect shareholders, ' 20 the Second Circuit
pointed out that "the very fact that a copy of the stockholders list is a
valuable instrument to a person seeking to gain control . . . is a good reason
for insuring 2that
shareholders have full information before they aid its
7
procurement."
Expanding the "solicitation test," Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & North
Western Ry. 2s held that a broker's report which concluded that one merger offer
was more attractive than a competing offer was a "communication to the stockholders 'reasonably calculated to result in the procurement [or] withholding...
of a proxy' within the meaning of [the Securities & Exchange Commission's regulations] ."29 This was so because the report was in a form advisory to Rock
Island stockholders: "The shareholder may be led readily to assume, contrary to fact, that the predictor has special knowledge or unique information
to bear out fully his prediction, and be3 0induced to rely upon a supposed expert
judgment of the mysteries of finance.
In the companion case, Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R.,81 the
lack of an intent to solicit a proxy was the sole factor considered by the court in
reaching its decision. There it was found that a newspaper advertisement by the
Union Pacific Railroad was not an unlawful proxy solicitation because no proxy
statement accompanied the advertisement which was directed to the public as
well as to Rock Island's shareholders. 8 2 The advertisement was, effectively, a
under a state statute to inspect shareholders lists, with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 694.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 695 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The courts to date have not construed section 14(a) with the breadth desired by the Commission in this opinion.
26. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).
27. 360 F.2d at 696.
28. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id. at 409.
31. 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964). These two cases arose from the competing proposals
before the directors of the Rock Island railroad for merger with either the Union Padfic
or the North Western railroads.
32. Id. at 125. The advertisement which was entitled "'Rock Island Stockholders, Employees, Shippers, [and] Midwest Communities will all benefit more if the Rock Island
merges with the Union Pacific'" argued that "a Union Pacific-Rock Island merger would
result in lower costs to shippers, better service to communities and substantial benefits to
Rock Island stockholders." Id. "It also said that the North Western offer ... would result In
decreased employment and payroll cuts." Id.
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counter argument to applications of the Chicago & North Western Railroad to
the Interstate Commerce Commission for approval of its proposed acquisition of
Rock Island's stock. The Court said: "[I] t appears that Union Pacific's purpose
in publishing the advertisement was to inform the public and motivate it to
oppose North Western's applications before the Commission. This is a valid
purpose inasmuch as the Commission is required to consider the public interest
and interested members of the public may be given an opportunity to be heard
.... "33 Thus, the advertisement was not deemed to be a proxy solicitation.
Three significant securities cases decided after 1967 may be read not only as a
continuation of the law set forth in preceding cases, but, taken together, they
seem to establish a trend toward stricter interpretation of the securities regulations and a broadening of defendant liability.
In Myzel v. Fields,34 an action was brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5 to set
aside a sale of stock of a dosed corporation where favorable future prospects
for the company and the true identity of the purchasers were alleged to have
been secreted. 35 The court found the defendants liable for violation of Rule
10b-S and refused to permit them to escape liability under the "good faith"
provision 36 of section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act.3 7
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,38 which was based on an interpretation of section 11 of the 1933 Act, 39 also imposed liability on one found to be responsible for publishing misleading material in connection with a securities transaction. In BarChris a director of the company was held liable solely because he
33. Id. A similar question of solicitation under the proxy rules arose in 1966, but was
never judicially resolved. See Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1966, at 10, coL 2; W. Cary, Cases and
Materials on Corporations 274 (4th ed. abr. 1970).
34. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 951 (1968).
35. Id. at 726-28.
36. Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U..C. § 78t (1970) provides:
"(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter ...

shall also be liable.

. .

to the same extent as such controlled person

...unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act... constituting the violation ....
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing
which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the provisions of this chapter...
through or by means of any other person."
37. 386 F.2d at 738-39. In dealing with this provision, the court found that "where the
evidence shows the 'controlling person' is the actual intended beneficiary of the stock
purchase, 'control' under the Act does not require knowledge of the specific wrongdoing any
more than a principal must know in advance of his agent's fraud." Id. at 738. Furthermore,
the court of appeals in Myzel criticized the district court for requiring not only knowledge
of the unlawful activities by the defendant, but also approval of the acts before responsibility would attach. The court found that "[s]uch requirements are neither explicit not
[sic] implicit in the Act." Id. at 739.
38. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S-D.N.Y. 1968). The case involved a spurious class action by
buyers of debentures against the defendant issuer for damages which resulted from false
statements and material omissions in the prospectus contained in the registration statement.
The district court held that the defendant failed to prove both the due diligence asserted and
any causal relationship between the damage suffered and the false statements. Id. at 682-92,
703-04.
39. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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had signed a debenture registration statement containing false statements and
material omissions. 40 Whether or not he read or understood the offending prospectus was immaterial since the court imposed a standard of reasonable care
on directors to investigate the facts presented in such situations; 4 ' a standard
the court found him to have failed to meet.
Dealing specifically with a proxy solicitation, and basing its decision on al42
leged violations of Rule 14a-9, the court in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, In.
held that the defendant had become a fiduciary to the shareholders of General
Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. and as such was liable for failure to disclose
4
appraised values of certain of General's properties which it intended to sell. 3
The court pointed out that a literal reading of section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9

proxy solicitation is sufficient
revealed that negligence alone in connection with 44
to establish the liability of the controlling company.

Miller v. Steinback,45 decided in 1967 by the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York, was the first case which actually ap-

plied a strict liability test under section 14(a). There it was determined that
strict liability must be imposed upon anyone who officially participates in the

use of misleading proxy material. Neither the "active solicitation" nor "intent
to solicit" tests were considered as the court completely ignored the defendant's
40. 283 F. Supp. at 685-86.
41. Id. at 684-92. For an interesting and rational discussion of BarChris, see BarChris:
A Dialogue on a Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 Geo. L.J. 221 (1968), wherein it was said
that "(elssentially, all the plaintiff in a section 11 action must prove is that the registration
statement, when it became effective, contained misstatements or omissions that were material,"
Id. at 225. If this is the case, it would seem that no considerations exist to dissuade the courts
from extending similar liability to the proxy rules.
42. 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). This action was brought by minority shareholders
of an advertising corporation which was merged into its dominating majority stockholder.
The plaintiffs sought restitution for damages alleged to have resulted from a proxy statement
which did not disclose either the appraisals of the book value of the outdoor advertising
plants acquired by the majority through the merger, or that offers to purchase for a price
exceeding that book value had been received from other outside sources. Id. at 73-74. The
court, in granting the relief sought, concluded that given a choice the reasonable stockholder
with all the facts before him would not have voted for a merger depriving him of a participation in substantial profits realizable upon the sale of remaining outdoor advertising plants.
Id. at 98.
43. Id. at 99. Skogmo's intent to sell also was undisclosed. Id.
44. Id. at 97. In treating the issues of this case the court found that "[tjhe defendant offered no proof showing absence of either reliance or causation on the part of the [plaintiff].
." Id. at 98. It noted further that a stockholder may bring an action under Rule 14a-9 on
behalf of stockholders who as a body may have been deceived by the proxy statement although he himself may not have been misled. Id. at 96. Therefore the materiality of the
omission and the existence of a duty to disclose known facts were the tests which the court
employed. Id. at 98-99. Much of the court's language strongly suggested strict liability:
"Negligence alone either in making a misrepresentation or in failing to disclose a material fact
in connection with proxy solicitation is sufficient to warrant recovery." Id. at 97.
45. 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This case actually dealt with the question of
whether a stockholder of a merged corporation had capacity to sue derivatively on behalf
of the merged corporation and against directors and officers of the surviving corporation. Id.
at 259-61.
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purpose, holding that "[s]ince a cause of action has been stated under § 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9, no discussion is necessary herein with respect to the directors
.. since all such defendants allegedly either solicited proxies or permitted the
use of their names to solicit proxies within the meaning of § 14(a). "4 This
trend towards strict construction of the liability imposed by all securities
regulations, including the proxy rules, provided the judicial setting in which
Beatty v. Bright47 was decided.
In Beatty, the court treated only one issue:
[W]hether an acquiring company in a merger agreement which provides that all
actions, proceedings, instruments and documents relating to the agreement shall be
"approved as to legal form, content and sufficiency" by counsel for the acquiring
company, becomes as responsible for misleading proxy statements as the soliciting
management of the acquired company when it exercises the right of approval to the
extent shown by the foregoing factual statements. 48
The materiality of the offending omissions was conceded, 40 and there was no
allegation that the defendants had themselves solicited any proxy. 0 The only
basis for finding defendants liable, therefore, was the contention that Life Investors either contributed misleading proxy material or approved of its presence
in the solicitation. The plaintiffs, in their motion for summary judgment,
asked the court to rule that, as a matter of law, Life Investors, the acquiring
corporation, was liable under section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it had
authority to control the wording of the illegal proxy statement and did so. 51
It was their position that Life Investors had jointly prepared the proxy statement with Gains and that: "'Life Investors, through its attorneys, failed to
recognize a material fact and failed to insist upon the inclusion of this material fact in the proxy statement . . . [therefore] Life Investors has violated
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9(a) ....
Once having begun to approve "instruments and documents-as to legal form, content and sufficiency," Life Investors
unquestionably and beyond all doubt brought itself within the purview of
[the Act].' "52
The court, however, refused to follow either the trend towards strict liability
evidenced in the recent decisions, or plaintiff's reading of the Act. It stated
that: "[T]he contract provision, and Life Investors' activities under it do not
46. Id. at 278 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Motion for summary judgment for
the defendants was thus denied. Note that the court applied the regulations literally, which
suggests liability for even minimal participation in a deceptive proxy solicitation. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1970); see text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
47. 345 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
48. Id. at 1191. The dearth of judicial guidance on this question adds to the importance
of Beatty.
49. Id. at 1188-89. The court did not question the materiality of the provisions, merely
noting that in the earlier case the court held the proxy statement was misleading and violated
the proxy rules. Id.
50. Id. at 1191. It should also be noted that the plaintiffs specifically did not claim that
Life Investors had voting control over Gains. Id.
51. Id. at 1189.
52. Id. at 1192.
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establish such control over the Gains proxy statement to make Life Investors
and its principal officers liable for misleading statements contained therein as
a matter of law."53 Distinguishing the cases relied on by plaintiffs on the
grounds that the acquiring company had either voting control or actual control,54 the court refused to hold that Life Investors' " 'ironclad contractual right
of control over the content of the proxy statement . . was every bit as effectual as voting control would have been . . . .' ", The decision pointed out that
"[i]t would be reasonable to infer that these provisions were placed in the
agreement to protect Life Investors, not to assume responsibility for the wording of the proxy statement." Despite the broad terms of the provision, 7 and
the number and nature of Life Investors' contributions in the preparation and
approval of the proxy statement,5" the court did not find sufficient control over
the process to make Life Investors liable as a matter of law for the misleading
statements. 59 The Beatty court refused to extend the recent trend to the
ultimate rule that one should be liable as a matter of law for misleading proxy
material for which he authorizes publication or permits the use of his name
It is this refusal, more than the actual result of the case, that makes Beatt)
significant.
The distinctions drawn by the Beatty court to the cases upon which the
plaintiffs relied should be examined. Although it did not specifically hold
in order to find liability that the control existing in the acquiring company need
be voting control, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.00 was distinguished on the
ground that in that instance the acquiring company had actual control over the
acquired company.61
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.6 2 was found to be unpersuasive for the same
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. The court perfunctorily distinguished the Mills and Gerstle cases as well as Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (EfD. Pa. 1970), finding
that "[p]laintiffs have cited no authorities in which acquiring companies have been held
responsible for misleading proxy statements under similar factual situations." 345 F. Supp.
at 1192.
55. 345 F. Supp. at 1191.
56. Id. at 1192. This language implies a consideration of the defendant's motive in controlling material which appeared in the solicitation. If so deemed, the determination would
be one of fact and strict liability as a matter of law could rarely be found.
57. Id. at 1189.
58. Twenty-two actions by Life Investors were reported in the record, including approval
of mailing the proxy and permission of the use of its name therein even though information
which the court found necessary, and which Life Investors had recommended be included
in the proxy, was omitted from the mailed statement. Id. at 1189-91.
59. Id. at 1192.
60. 396 U.S. 375 (1970) ; see notes 7-8, 11 supra.
61. 345 F. Supp. at 1192. In Mills the minority shareholders had brought suit derivatively
and as a class to set aside a merger of Auto-Lite and Merganthaler Linotype Co., which
before the merger owned over half of Auto-Lite's stock. 396 U.S. at 377-78. The Supreme
Court held that based on alleged violations of § 14(a) of the Act, a cause of action for dissolution of the merger existed. Id. at 381-85.
62. 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); see notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
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reason. The Beatty court apparently did not consider that Life Investors
might have had the fiduciary relationship to Gains shareholders which was
found to exist in Gerstle. The literal reading of section 14(a) which resulted in
Gerstle's negilgence test was also ignored by the Beatty court." Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chemical Co.(" was similarly distinguished;

the acquiring corporation there had previously obtained working control of the

company to be acquired.68
Both BarChri67 and Myzel s were distinguished as not involving section
14 of the Securities Exchange Act.69 This distinction seems to ignore the real
significance of the cases, i.e., that in BarChris an issuing director, once he signed
the registration statement, was held to a duty to investigate the facts presented
therein, 0 and in Myzel that the "good faith" provisions of section 20 did
not provide a defense for securities law violations. 71
Despite the persuasive language of BarChris and Myzel, the Beatty court
apparently felt that sufficient control by Life Investors had not been shown to
establish a violation as a matter of law, even though Life Investors manifestly
had a greater part in the proxy publication than merely permitting the use of its
name to solicit proxies in contravention of the securities regulations. This conclusion results in some significant observations to be drawn from Beatty.
63. 345 F. Supp. at 1192.
64. In Gerstle it was said that "negligence alone ... is sufficient to warrant recovery." 298
F. Supp. at 97; see notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. Why the Beatty court ignored
this language, in view of Life Investors' activities, is one of the perplexing questions about the
decision.
65. 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
66. 345 F. Supp. at 1192. Colonial Realty concerned a proposed merger. The court held
that the agreement therein would have increased the defendant's holdings of the acquired
stock so as to give working control, and thus, the omission of these facts was misleading.
312 F. Supp. at 1299-1300.
67. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
68. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) ; see notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
69. 345 F. Supp. at 1192.
70. 283 F. Supp. at 685-86. Although admittedly distinguishable from Beatty, the Beatty
court might have seized the suggestion of strict liability which was apparent in the BarChris
language. The New York court found that "[als a signer [of the registration statement, the
defendant] could not avoid responsibility by leaving it up to others to make it accurate."
Id. at 686. Further, the distinction made by the Beatty court seems less persuasive when one
considers that the fundamental purpose of section 11 is to require full and truthful disclosure
(id. at 686), the precise purpose of the proxy provisions.
71. 386 F.2d at 739. Since the Beatty court applied the same considerations to an imposition of liability for violations of section 10(b) (upon which Myzel's liability was founded)
as for those it treated under section 14(a), the court could have noted that "good faith"
(or provisions not intended to assume responsibility) likewise did not preclude a finding of
liability. This would seem particularly appropriate since Life Investors not only knew of
the contents of the offending material but also held and exercised the right to approve of its
inclusion. At the very minimum the actions were "negligent" within the meaning of Gerstle.
Compare note 58 with notes 44 & 64 supra. See also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298
F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). "[Tlhe precedents under Rule 10b-5 are in most caes applicable [to] violations of Rule 14a-9 [although] not limited by those precedents." Id. at 96.
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Since there was no allegation that Life Investors solicited the proxies, solicitation and/or purpose to solicit proxies apparently were not required by the
Beatty court in order to establish liability under section 14. The court thus
based its decision strictly on the control exercised by the acquiring corporation
over the proxy solicitation, while suggesting several alternatives that would
establish sufficient control to find liability. Implicitly, the cases distinguished
by the district court in Beatty do establish sufficent control to find liability as
a matter of law. That is, the existence of voting control, working control, or a
fiduciary relationship on the part of Life Investors apparently would have
been sufficient to provide plaintiffs a basis for the relief they sought. Moreover, the Beatty court did not rule out the possibility that something less
would also have sufficed to hold the defendants liable in fact. It is thus entirely
possible that the facts of this case did establish defendant's liability; but the
Beatty court held that this was a triable question, and hence plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment could not be granted.
The Beatty court should have gone further. A finding of strict liability of
the acquiring corporation as a matter of law for any misleading material
contained in a proxy solicitation in which it participates or permits the use of
its name would have been desirable. Such a ruling would have provided the
dual service of maximum protection to stockholders, and notice to the parties
to a solicitation of precisely that for which they will be held accountable. 72
It would eliminate considerations of extent and degree of actual or implied control which are difficult to resolve and unnecessary to follow. Furthermore, this
would be consistent with the almost universal belief that one should be responsible for that to which he officially gives his approval. The rights of acquiring
corporations cannot be said to be less protected if these corporations are put
on advance notice that they too will be held liable for misleading statements
in a proxy solicitation to which they ascribe. Subterfuge by the parties in
order to insulate the survivor would be eliminated, and the arguments against
such strict liability which arose following the BarChris decision would not
apply. 3
Imposition of strict liability coincides with current market trends toward
greater stockholder protection, satisfies the literal intent of Congress in enacting the securities provisions and is responsive to the growing concern for consumer welfare. Adoption of such a rule deserves judicial consideration in future
cases of this nature.
72. In this way the court would correct the objection in Robbins that the defendant was
not apprised of that for which he would be held liable. See notes 16-18 supra.
73. The BarChris decision created a furor in the legal and securities communities. The
prospect of its impact on the corporate world generally resulted in two fears which have
since proved unfounded: first, that the new requirements in the filing of a prospectus would
result in diminished financing available to corporations; and second, that prospective directors, wary of potential liability, would hesitate to assume directorships. See, e.g., Comment,
Section 11 of the Securities Act: The Unresolved Dilemma of Participating Underwriters, 40
Fordham L. Rev. 869 (1972); Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1030 (1968).

